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AFRICAN AMERICAN DISPROPORTIONALITY IN SCHOOL DISCIPLINE
I.	Introduction

Student discipline is one of the more complex problems confronting educators.1
One recent survey of educators and school law attorneys2 ranked student discipline as
the third most important legal issue confronting educators after special education
and student expression.3 An educator’s action on a disciplinary matter is generally
found constitutional if the policy is considered to be rationally related to a legitimate
government interest.4 When disciplining students, however, school officials’ “power
is not unlimited and cannot be arbitrarily exercised.”5
Controversies surrounding school discipline are thus not about whether school
administrators have the right and responsibility to address discipline and school
safety, but rather how that is to be accomplished. In response to a widespread
perception that school violence was increasing dramatically, the policy of zero
tolerance, mandating harsher consequences for both major and minor violations,
began to be widely implemented in schools and school districts.6 Although subsequent
data demonstrated that school violence had in fact remained stable over a twentyyear period,7 the implementation of zero tolerance policies led to substantial increases
in the rates of out-of-school suspension and expulsion.8 Two categories of suspensions
and expulsions have caused particular controversy at the local level: those in which
students have been suspended or expelled for what seem to be trivial infractions (e.g.,
making a paper gun) and those where racial disparities in suspension and expulsion
are clearly evident.9
In the area of school discipline, the United States has absorbed the doctrine of in
loco parentis, which literally means “in place of the parent,” from English common
law.10 The British established this law to accord certain rights and responsibilities to
children’s non-parental caregivers.11 The most common usage of this law was in the
1.

Stephen B. Thomas, Nelda H. Cambron-McCabe & Martha McCarthy, Public School Law:
Teachers’ and Students’ Rights 224 (6th ed. 2009).

2.

A school law attorney may represent students or school districts in matters related to school legal issues.

3.

Susan Bon et al., School Law for Teachers: What Every Preservice Teacher Should Know, ELA Notes, Mar.
2008, at 18.

4.

See Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 799 (1997).

5.

Lee v. Macon County Bd. of Educ., 490 F.2d 458, 460 (5th Cir. 1974).

6.

Russell J. Skiba & Reece L. Peterson, The Dark Side of Zero Tolerance: Can Punishment Lead to Safe
Schools?, 80 Phi Delta Kappan 372, 372–76, 381–82 (1999).

7.

See generally Nat’l Ctr. for Educ. Statistics, Indicators of School Crime and Safety: Annual
Report (1999).

8.

Johanna Wald & Daniel J. Losen, Defining and Redirecting a School-to-Prison Pipeline, New Directions
for Youth Dev. Fall 2003, at 10.

9.

Skiba & Peterson, supra note 6.

10.

5 West’s Encyclopedia of American Law, 351, 352 (2d Ed. 2005), available at http://www.answers.
com/topic/in-loco-parentis.

11.

Id.
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teacher-student relationship, although it also applies to legal guardianships.12 In loco
parentis is often cited as the basis for school officials’ authority to discipline students.13
These policies permit school officials to reasonably exercise their custodial powers by
intervening when students present dangerous situations to themselves and others.
In the history of efforts to curb or respond to undesirable student behaviors, school
officials have relied on a variety of disciplinary measures. Through the 1960s, corporal
punishment was the most prevalent form of intervention in schools.14 Eventually, as
physical punishments have fallen from favor, suspension, generally considered a removal
from school for ten days or less, and expulsion, typically the removal from school for
more than ten days, have become more widely used. Today only twenty-two states have
laws permitting corporal punishment,15 while out-of-school suspension has become the
most common administrative response to student disciplinary infractions.16 Available
national estimates suggest that one million American students missed at least one day
of school due to out-of-school suspension or expulsion in the 1970s.17 During the
1990s, that number doubled and reached an estimated 3.1 million or approximately 7%
of the student population.18 Both state and local district reports suggest increases in
out-of-school suspension rates at the local level.19
Although out-of school suspension and expulsion appear to provide a short-term
solution to school disciplinary problems by separating disruptive students from the
educational environment, in practice, the use of disciplinary exclusion raises thorny
questions for schools and administrators. Given that educational research has
consistently shown that the strongest predictor of academic achievement is active
academic engagement,20 strategies such as suspension and expulsion pose a dilemma
12.

Id.

13.

Julie K. Underwood & L. Dean Webb, School Law for Teachers: Concepts and Applications
167 (2005).

14.

See generally Thomas et al., supra note 1, at 240.

15.

Id. at 170–71.

16.

Russell J. Skiba & M. Karega Rausch, Zero Tolerance, Suspension, and Expulsion: Questions of Equity and
Effectiveness, in Handbook of Classroom Management: Research, Practice, and Contemporary
Issues 1063, 1066 (Carolyn M. Evertson, & Carol S. Weinstein eds., 2006).

17.

Kim Brooks, Vincent Schiraldi & Jason Zeidenberg, School House Hype: Two Years Later
(2000), available at http://www.cjcj.org/files/schoolhouse.pdf; see also U.S. Dep’t of Educ., The 20002001 Elementary and Secondary School Survey: National and State Projections for
Enrollment and Selected Items by Race/Ethnicity and Sex (2000), available at http://ocrdata.
ed.gov/ocr2000rv30/wdsdata.html; Linda M. Raffaele Mendez & Howard M. Knoff, Who Gets
Suspended from School and Why: A Demographic Analysis of Schools and Disciplinary Infractions in a Large
School District, 26 Educ. & Treatment Child. 30, 31 (2003).

18.

Id.

19.

David Richart, Kim Brooks & Mark Soler, Unintended Consequences: The Impact of “Zero
Tolerance” and Other Exclusionary Policies on Kentucky Students (2003), available at http://
www.buildingblocksforyouth.org/kentucky/kentucky.pdf; Mendez & Knoff, supra note 17, at 31.

20. See generally Charles R. Greenwood, Betty T. Horton & Cheryl A. Utley, Academic Engagement: Current

Perspectives on Research and Practice, 31 Sch. Psychol. Rev. 328, 328–49 (2002); Charles W. Fisher et
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for administrators by removing students from the opportunity to learn. The use of
suspension and expulsion has also raised civil rights concerns due to strong and
consistent evidence that students of color are over-represented among those who are so
disciplined.21 A number of authors have argued that the increased use of zero tolerance
is directly responsible for increasing racial and ethnic disparities in school discipline.22
In this paper, we review both the status of case law and research regarding school
discipline in general and racial/ethnic disparities in school discipline in particular.
Although there is a clear consensus that schools have a responsibility to use all
effective strategies to promote safety and an effective instructional environment,
research has consistently failed to find that suspension and expulsion are among
those effective strategies. Yet the courts have typically provided wide latitude to
schools in disciplinary matters. A similar analysis in the area of racial disparities in
discipline shows a distinct gap between the scientific knowledge base regarding racial
disparities in discipline and the absence of a legal strategy accepted by the courts to
address such disparities. Analysis of case law reveals that this gap appears to be
related to the court’s adherence to a colorblind interpretation of the Constitution.
Then, we examine how the “Final Guidance on Maintaining, Collecting, and
Reporting Racial and Ethnic Data to the U.S. Department of Education” might
further impact student discipline cases involving students of color. Finally, in order
to better understand the context of the court’s decision making regarding disciplinary
disproportionality cases, we will review the historical development and current status
of the doctrine of colorblind constitutionalism.
II.	Status of Research and Case Law with Respect to Discipline

School discipline has been defined as having two main purposes: a) ensuring the
safety of those within the school, and b) creating an “environment conducive to
learning.” 23 Administrators may also be attempting to c) “reduce rates of future
misbehavior,” and d) “[teach] students needed skills for successful interaction in
school and society.” 24 In the following sections, we review literature from social
science research to explore the extent to which suspension and expulsion achieve
those ends. We also review case law concerning the extent to which the courts are
willing to limit the use of zero tolerance, suspension, or expulsion as school
disciplinary methods.
al., Teaching Behaviors, Academic Learning Time, and Student Achievement: An Overview, J. Classroom
Interaction, Winter 1981, at 2.
21.

The Civil Rights Project, Harvard Univ., Opportunities Suspended: The Devastating
Consequences of Zero Tolerance and School Discipline Policies vi (2000).

22.

See Frances P. Solari & Julienne E.M. Balshaw, Outlawed and Exiled: Zero Tolerance and Second
Generation Race Discrimination in Public Schools, 29 N.C. Cent. L.J. 147, 149–50 (2007).

23.

Joan Gaustad, School Discipline, Eric Clearinghouse on Educational Management, 1992, available
at http://www.ericdigests.org/1992-1/school.htm.

24.

Skiba & Rausch, supra note 16, at 1064.
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A. Scientific Findings: The Efficacy of Zero Tolerance

Clearly, schools have a right and responsibility to use any and all effective means
necessary to ensure that students can learn and teachers can teach. Yet the inherent
risks involved in school suspension and expulsion make these methods something of
a “devil’s bargain,” since increases in school exclusion decrease student time spent in
learning. For principals facing such a dilemma, the question becomes one of costbenefit: Does the removal of troublesome students from school provide sufficient
benefits in terms of reduced disruption and improved school climate to offset the
risks to educational opportunity and school bonding inherent in suspension and
expulsion? Unfortunately, data on quality of implementation and outcomes raise
serious questions about the effectiveness of school exclusion.
		

1. Quality of Implementation.

One important criterion for the effectiveness of an educational intervention is
quality of implementation, often termed “treatment integrity” or “treatment fidelity.”25
That is, the quality of an intervention cannot be guaranteed unless that intervention
can be implemented as intended in a variety of settings. For suspension and expulsion,
“used as intended” would most likely entail the consistent application of those
procedures, based on student behavior, in response to relatively serious threats to
school safety or the learning climate.
There appears, however, to be a high rate of inconsistency in the application of
school suspension and expulsion across schools and school districts, and that
inconsistency appears to be due as much to classroom, school, or principal
characteristics as to student behavior. 26 District-wide studies of school discipline
have typically found a high degree of inconsistency in the use of suspension and
expulsion across schools.27 Some of this variation in usage of suspension appears to
be due to variations in student behavior; it is likely that there are schools whose
students engage in higher rates of the disruptive and endangering behaviors that one
would expect to lead to increased suspension and expulsion. 28 Yet, school and
classroom characteristics also make a strong contribution to the inconsistency of
application of suspension and expulsion across schools. In particular, schools whose
principals have a disciplinary philosophy favoring the use of school exclusion tend to
have higher rates of out-of-school suspension and expulsion, and lower usage of other
25.

Kathleen L. Lane et al., Treatment Integrity: An Essential—but often forgotten—Component of SchoolBased Interventions, Preventing Sch. Failure, Spring 2004, at 36, 36–43.

26. Skiba & Rausch, supra note 16, at 1066.
27.

Mass. Advocacy Ctr., The Way Out: Student Exclusion Practices in Boston Middle
Schools (1986); Susan C. Kaeser, Suspensions in School Discipline, 11 Educ. & Urb. Soc’y. 465, 465–84
(1979).

28. See Jeffrey Fagan & Deanna L. Wilkinson, Social Contents and Functions of Adolescent Violence, in

Delbert S. Elliott, Beatrix A. Hamburg & Kirk R. Williams, Violence in American Schools
55, 58 (1998).
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disciplinary alternatives. 29 Shi-Chang Wu and his colleagues, in a multivariate
analysis of the predictors of out-of-school suspension, found that school characteristics
and non-behavioral student characteristics (e.g., race) made a more significant
contribution to predicting school suspension than student behavior and attitude,
leading them to conclude:
One could argue from this finding that if students are interested in reducing
their chances of being suspended, they will be better off by transferring to a
school with a lower suspension rate than by improving their attitudes or
reducing their misbehavior.30

Nor is the evidence promising that suspension and expulsion are actually used as
intended in school settings. 31 Although it is typically assumed that school suspension
is reserved for more serious offenses, data suggest that out-of-school suspension is
actually used in response to a wide range of behavior from fighting to insubordination,
with only a small percentage of suspensions occurring in response to behavior that
threatens the safety or security of schools.32 Similarly, Donald Stone, in reporting the
results of a national survey of school disciplinary practices in thirty-five districts
representing over a million students, concludes: “It appears clear that on reviewing
the data to determine if the crime fits the punishment, the answer is no.”33
		

2. Outcomes of Suspension and Expulsion

As noted, there is little controversy over the right and responsibility of schools to
use all effective means in order to ensure the safety of schools, maintain the integrity
of the learning environment, and improve student behavior.34 What is at issue is the
means by which this goal is pursued. Advocates of zero tolerance approaches make
two presumptions regarding the effects of exclusionary discipline. First, there is a
29. See The Civil Rights Project, supra note 21, at vii–viii; Gathogo Mukuria, Disciplinary Challenges:

How Do Principals Address This Dilemma?, 37 Urban Educ. 432, 448–49 (2002); Russell J. Skiba et al.,
Consistent removal: Contributions of school discipline to the school-prison pipeline 2 (2003) (Paper presented
at the Harvard Civil Rights Conference School-to-Prison Pipeline Conference, Cambridge, MA),
available at http://www.civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/pipeline03/Skibbav3.pdf [hereinafter
Contributions of School Discipline].

30. Shi-Chang Wu et al., Student Suspension: A Critical Reappraisal, 14 Urban Rev. 245, 255–56 (1982).
31.

Id. Since out-of-school suspension by its nature excludes children from schooling, they inherently create
some degree of risk for reducing a students’ opportunity to learn. Thus, used as intended presumes that
these punishments will be used judiciously and sparingly, primarily in response to those behaviors that
seriously threaten school safety or the integrity of the learning environment. Id.

32.

Mendez & Knoff, supra note 17, at 30–32.

33.

Donald H. Stone, Crime and Punishment in Public Schools: An Empirical Study of Disciplinary Proceedings,
17 J. Am. J. Trial Advoc. 351, 367 (1993–1994).

34. As noted above the four purposes of school discipline noted above can be summarized in as interventions

that 1) improve or maintain the quality of the school disciplinary climate through a) increasing in the
probability of a safe environment, or b) improving the integrity of the instructional climate; and 2)
change student behavior by either c) reducing rates of future misbehavior, or d) teaching students needed
skills for successful interaction. Gaustad, supra note 23; Skiba & Rausch, supra note 16.
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belief that severe consequences such as suspension or expulsion serve a deterrent
function, either upon those who may witness the punishment or upon the future
infractions of the punished student.35 Second, school exclusion is intended in part to
remove troublemakers in order to improve the school climate based on the belief that
removing the most persistently disruptive students will lead to substantial
improvements in teaching and learning for the remaining students. 36
Empirical support for these presumptions has yet to be found, however. 37 In
terms of deterrence, there is no data showing that out-of-school suspension or
expulsion reduces the future likelihood of student disruption. Studies of suspension
have consistently found relatively high rates of repeat offending among those who are
suspended, suggesting a clear lack of deterrence for those students. 38 If anything,
disciplinary removal appears to have negative effects on future student behavior;
students suspended in elementary school are more likely to receive office referrals or
suspensions in secondary school, 39 prompting some researchers to conclude that for
some students, “suspension functions as a reinforcer . . . rather than as a punisher.”40
Similarly, there is little evidence supporting the notion that removing troublesome
students improves the learning climate for the remaining students. Suspension and
expulsion are apparently used to rid schools of students who are perceived to be
troublemakers. In the long-term, school suspension has been found to be moderately
associated with higher rates of school dropout and has been reported to be used in
some schools as a means of encouraging certain students to drop out of school (the
so-called pushout phenomenon).41 Yet counter-intuitively, purging the school of such
students does not guarantee improvements in school climate. Schools with higher
rates of school suspension have been found to have a lower rating on academic quality,
35.

Charles P. Ewing, Sensible zero tolerance protects students, Harv. Educ. Letter (Jan.–Feb. 2000) (on file
with authors). Ewing argues that zero tolerance “appropriately denounces violent student behavior in no
uncertain terms and serves as a deterrent to such behavior in the future by sending a clear message that acts
which physically harm or endanger others will not be permitted at school under any circumstances.” Id.

36. Public Agenda, Teaching Interrupted: Do Discipline Policies in Today’s Public Schools

Foster the Common Good? (2004), available at http://www.publicagenda.org/files/pdf/teaching_
interrupted.pdf.

37.

See, e.g., Russell J. Skiba et al., Are Zero Tolerance Policies Effective in the Schools? An Evidentiary Review
and Recommendations, 63 Am. Psychol. Ass’n. 852, 854 (2008).

38. Christine Bowditch, Getting Rid of Troublemakers: High School Disciplinary Procedures and the Production

of Dropouts, 40 Soc. Problems 493, 498–99 (1993); Virginia Costenbader & Samia Markson, School
Suspension: A Study with Secondary School Students, 36 J. Sch. Psychol. 59, 59–82 (1998); John D.
McCarthy & Dean R. Hoge, The Social Construction of School Punishment: Racial Disadvantage out of a
Universalistic Process, 65 Soc. Forces 1101, 1111–15 (1986–1987).

39.

Linda M. Raffaele Mendez, Predictors of Suspension and Negative School Outcomes: A Longitudinal
Investigation, New Directions for Youth Dev., Fall 2003, at 17; Tary Tobin, George Sugai & Geoff
Colvin, Patterns in Middle School Discipline Records, 4 J. Emotional & Behav. Disorders 82, 82–94
(1996).

40. Tobin, Sugai & Colvin, supra note 39, at 91.
41.

Ruth B. Ekstrom et al., Who Drops out of High School and Why? Findings from a National Study, in School
Dropouts: Patterns and Policies (Gary Natriello ed., 1986); Bowditch, supra note 38.

1077

AFRICAN AMERICAN DISPROPORTIONALITY IN SCHOOL DISCIPLINE

pay significantly less attention to school climate, and have lower ratings of the quality
of school governance.42 Most importantly, recent data indicate that schools with
higher rates of school suspension and expulsion have poorer achievement outcomes
on standardized tests of achievement, regardless of the economic level or
demographics.43 It is difficult to argue that disciplinary removals result in
improvements to the school learning climate when schools that suspend and expel
more students have lower average test scores.
The scientific literature in psychology and education has identified a variety of
effective alternative strategies that, singly and in concert, show great promise for
reducing school violence and disruption without resorting to high rates of suspension
and expulsion. Numerous research studies, as well as a number of government panels,
have been highly consistent in identifying a host of interventions and programs that
have demonstrated efficacy in promoting school safety and reducing the potential for
youth violence.44 These strategies have been increasingly organized in the literature
into a three-level model of primary prevention.45 Implementation trials that weave
such interventions into comprehensive structural reform models of school discipline,
such as Positive Behavioral Supports or Safe and Responsive Schools, have yielded
promising results in terms of reductions in office referrals, school suspensions, and
expulsions, and improved ratings on measures of school climate.46
In response to such data, the American Psychological Association convened a
task force to examine the effectiveness of zero tolerance policies and to offer
recommendations for reform of such policies. That task force concluded that
42.

Frank Bickel & Robert Qualls, The Impact of School Climate on Suspension Rates in the Jefferson County
Public Schools, 12 Urban Rev. 79, 79–86 (1980); James E. Davis & Will J. Jordan, The Effects of School
Context, Structure, and Experiences on African American Males in Middle and High Schools, 63 J. Negro
Educ. 570, 570–87 (1994); Darryl A. Hellman & Susan Beaton, The Pattern of Violence in Urban Public
Schools: The Influence in Urban Public Schools, 23 J. Res. Crime & Delinq. 102, 102–27 (1986).

43.

Skiba & Rausch, supra note 16, at 1072.

44. See, e.g., Office of Special Educ. & Rehabilitative Serv. et al., Early Warning, Timely

Response: A Guide to Safe Schools (1998), available at http://cecp.air.org/guide/guide.pdf;
Lawrence W. Sherman et al., Nat’l Inst. of Justice, Preventing Crime: What Works, What
Doesn’t, What’s Promising (1997), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/171676.PDF; Youth
Violence: A Report of the Surgeon General (Delbert Elliot et al. eds., 2001), available at http://
www.surgeongeneral.gov/library/youthviolence/report.html#message; Mark T. Greenberg et al.,
Enhancing School-Based Prevention and Youth Development Through Coordinated Social, Emotional, and
Academic Learning, 58 Am. Psychol. Ass’n. 466 (2003); Sharon Mihalic et al., Blueprints for Violence
Prevention, Juv. Just. Bull., July 2001; Patrick H. Tolan, Nancy G. Guerra & Philip C. Kendall,
Introduction to Special Section: Prediction and Prevention of Antisocial Behavior in Children and Adolescents,
63 J. Consulting & Clinical Psychol. 515, 515–17 (1995).

45.

Am. Psychol. Ass’n., Violence and youth: Psychology’s Response (1993); Elliott, supra note 28;
Hill M. Walker et al., Integrated Approaches to Preventing Antisocial Behavior Patterns Among School-age
Children and Youth, 4 J. Emotional & Behav. Disorders 194, 194–209 (1996).

46. See, e.g., Russell J. Skiba et al., The Safe and Responsive Schools Project: A School Reform Model for

Implementing Best Practices in Violence Prevention, in The Handbook of School Violence and School
Safety (Shane R. Jimerson & Michael J. Furlong eds., 2006); George Sugai & Robert R. Horner, A
Promising Approach for Expanding and Sustaining School Wide Positive Behavior Support, 35 Sch. Psychol.
Rev. 245 (2006).
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An examination of the evidence shows that zero tolerance policies as
implemented have failed to achieve the goals of an effective system of school
discipline . . . . Zero tolerance has not been shown to improve school climate
or school safety. Its application in suspension and expulsion has not proven an
effective means of improving student behavior. It has not resolved, and indeed
may have exacerbated, minority over-representation in school punishments.
Zero tolerance policies as applied appear to run counter to our best knowledge
of child development. By changing the relationship of education and juvenile
justice, zero tolerance may shift the locus of discipline from relatively
inexpensive actions in the school setting to the highly costly processes of
arrest and incarceration. In so doing, zero tolerance policies have created
unintended consequences for students, families, and communities.47

In an era characterized by a focus on educational accountability, it is noteworthy that
the disciplinary strategies that are most commonly used in schools today—suspension
and expulsion—have not been found to be in any way effective in ensuring the safety
of schools or improving the learning climate.
B. Case Law Regarding Zero Tolerance, Suspension, and Expulsion

As noted, discipline is often defined as any intervention that ensures the safety of
the school environment or guarantees an environment conducive to learning.48 Thus,
nearly any behavior that endangers the safety of others or disrupts the classroom can
be subjected to disciplinary measures (regardless of whether those measures have
been shown to be effective in achieving those goals). The measures covered under
the umbrella of “school discipline” vary widely, as do the situations in which they can
be employed. This wide range occurs, at least partially, because state legislatures pass
laws and local school districts write policies outlining school discipline requirements
and guidelines. Typically, state statutes permit school authorities to exclude a student
from instruction if his or her conduct disrupts school operations. However, because
the power to suspend or expel a student from school is based on state law, the use of
these punishments varies between jurisdictions.49 Also, although the state determines
the policies, local school districts have discretion to institute more detailed discipline
policies than those described by the state. Thus, even within a state, policies may
differ from school to school.
While it would seem that inconsistent application of disciplinary measures would
prove fertile ground for student lawsuits, students have often been unsuccessful when
challenging school disciplinary decisions.50 One explanation for this lack of success is
that the courts have recognized that it is necessary for school officials to have
47.

Am. Psychol. Ass’n Zero Tolerance Task Force, Are Zero Tolerance Policies Effective in Schools? An
Evidentiary Review and Recommendations, 63 Am. Psychol. 852, 860 (2008).

48. Gaustad, supra note 23.
49. Paul M. Bogos, Expelled. No Excuses. No Exceptions., 74 U. Det. Mercy L. Rev. 357, 366 (1997).
50. Thomas, Cambron-McCabe & McCarthy, supra note 1.
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discretion in disciplinary matters.51 Therefore, courts tend to defer to school officials
when it comes to disciplinary matters.52 Kevin Brady reports that because courts
“have been extremely reluctant to overturn school disciplinary decisions, particularly
long-term suspensions and expulsions, on substantive due process grounds,”53 school
districts maintain great control over student disciplinary matters. So long as a
disciplinary decision is “justified by a legitimate educational interest,” the courts tend
to side with school officials in many discipline-related disputes.54
State law and school district policies generally document the grounds for
suspension and expulsion as well as the required procedures for employing these
measures. These policies must align with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, which protects students in two ways. Under the procedural component
of the Due Process Clause, the state must provide fair procedures when a person is
deprived of life, liberty, or property.55 The substantive component requires that the
state’s actions not be arbitrary or unreasonable.56 Substantive due process also requires
that government actions be reasonably related to a legitimate state purpose.57
Thus, when disciplining students, school officials must demonstrate that their
policies and actions are related to a legitimate state interest. Here, the interest is in
creating a safe environment in which students can learn. In the context of school
discipline, then, punishment does not implicate substantive due process unless the
action is “arbitrary, capricious, or wholly unrelated to the legitimate state goal of
maintaining an atmosphere conducive to learning.”58 Finally, school administrators
must put procedures in place, such as notices and hearings, which allow the student
to respond to the allegations made against him or her. Generally, if discipline
procedures satisfy due process requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment, courts
uphold the actions of educators as long as they are reasonable.59

51.

See Charles J. Russo, Reutter’s the Law of Public Education 750 (2004).

52.

Alicia C. Insley, Comment, Suspending and Expelling Children from Educational Opportunity: Time to
Reevaluate Zero Tolerance Policies, 50 Am. U. L. Rev. 1039, 1055 (2001).

53.

Kevin P. Brady, Zero Tolerance or (In)Tolerance Policies? Weaponless School Violence, Due Process, and the
Law of Student Suspensions and Expulsions: An Examination of Fuller v. Decatur Public School Board of
Education School District, 22 BYU Educ. & L.J. 159, 198 (2001); see also Enterprise City Bd. of Educ.
v. C.P. ex rel. J.P. & M.P., 698 So.2d 131, 132–33 (Ala. Civ. App. 1996).

54. Brady, supra note 53, at 168–69 (quoting McCarthy, Cambron-McCabe & Thomas, supra note 1, at

196).

55.

U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1; Patrick Pauken & Philip T.K. Daniel, Race Discrimination & Disability
Discrimination in School Discipline: A Legal and Statistical Analysis, 139 Educ. L. Rep. 759, 761 n.15
(2000).

56. Pauken & Daniel, supra note 55, at 761 n.15.
57.

See Smith v. Texas, 550 U.S. 297, 325 (2007).

58. Jefferson ex rel. Jefferson v. Ysleta Indep. Sch. Dist., 817 F.2d 303, 305–06 (5th Cir. 1987) (quoting

Woodward v. Los Fresnos Indep. Sch. Dist., 732 F.2d 1243, 1246 (5th Cir. 1984)).

59.

See Brady, supra note 53, at 169.
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1. Due Process Rights: Goss v. Lopez

States and schools have relied upon the Supreme Court decision Goss v. Lopez for
over thirty years to provide guidance on due process procedures. In Goss, a public
school principal in Columbus, Ohio suspended nine black high school students after
their involvement in a demonstration that included “disruptive” and “disobedient”
conduct.60 The principal did not provide a hearing but instead invited all of the
students and their parents to participate in a conference to discuss the students’
futures.61 Under Ohio law at the time of Goss v. Lopez, when a student was suspended,
the principal was required to notify the student’s parents within twenty-four hours,
explaining the reason for her or his action.62 The state law did permit parents to
appeal a suspension decision to the Board of Education, but the school district did
not have any written procedures for suspension in place.63 The students in Goss
challenged the state law and filed a lawsuit arguing that the Ohio law violated the
Fourteenth Amendment by permitting public school officials to deprive the students
of their rights to an education without a hearing.64
Upholding the district court’s decision, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the
students’ Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated.65 The Court reasoned that
education is a property right under state law, stating that “a student’s legitimate
entitlement to a public education [is] a property interest which is protected by the
Due Process Clause and which may not be taken away . . . without adherence to the
minimum procedures required by that Clause.”66 The Court further noted that
“[students have] a strong interest in procedural safeguards that minimize the risk of
wrongful punishment . . . .”67 When school officials fail to adhere to due process
requirements they “can well break the spirits of the expelled students and of others
familiar with the injustice, and do inestimable harm to their education.”68
Goss v. Lopez set the standard for the minimal constitutional requirements when
a student is suspended for ten days or less. The Court stated that students must be
given oral or written notice of the charges; then, if the student denies the charges,
school officials must present an explanation of the evidence and offer the student an
opportunity to present his or her side of the story.69 At least one appellate court has
further interpreted this to mean that school authorities can fulfill due process
60. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 568–69 (1975).
61.

Id. at 570.

62. Id. at 567.
63. Id. at 567–68.
64. Id. at 568–69.
65.

Id.

66. Id. at 574.
67.

Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 676 (1977).

68. Dixon v. Ala. State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 157 (5th Cir. 1961).
69. Goss, 419 U.S. at 581.
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requirements by informally discussing the alleged misconduct with students.70
Therefore, while students who are expelled or suspended are entitled to some form of
procedural due process, school officials merely need to employ fair procedures in
order to fulfill the constitutional requirement. Of course, the due process requirements
differ with respect to the length of the exclusion from school.
Interestingly, the Goss decision did not include guidance for longer suspensions or
expulsions. Instead, the decision ambiguously stated that “longer suspensions or
expulsions for the remainder of the school term, or permanently, may require more
formal procedures.”71 As such, some school administrators look to the Fifth Circuit’s
Dixon v. Alabama State Board of Education decision for further guidance regarding
expulsion.72 In Dixon, students attending a state college were expelled without notice
of the charges and without a hearing after they participated in a lunch counter sitin.73 The court held that the expelled students should be given the names of the
witnesses against them and an oral or written report on the acts to which each
witness testified.74 The court also stated that students should be given the opportunity
to present their own defense against the charges and to produce either oral testimony
or written affidavits of witnesses.75 Relying on the Dixon decision, school officials
implement more due process procedures for more serious offenses.76
Most states have enacted legislation codifying the principles set forth in the Goss
v. Lopez decision.77 The details of the required procedures vary according to different
state statutes and school board regulations, which outline the required procedures.
Also, procedural requirements may differ depending on the circumstances of the
particular situation.78 Courts have often considered the following factors when
determining whether a student received adequate due process in an expulsion: 1)
notice of the charges, 2) a hearing before an impartial tribunal, 3) the right to counsel,
4) the right to present witnesses, and 5) the right to cross examine.79 A school’s
responsibility to a student after he or she has been suspended or expelled also varies.
Once a general education student is expelled, the school district does not need to
provide educational services unless such requirements are specified by the school
70. Smith ex rel. Smith v. Severn, 129 F.3d 419 (7th Cir. 1997).
71.

Goss, 419 U.S. at 584.

72. See Dixon, 294 F.2d at 152.
73. Id. at 151–54.
74.

Id. at 159.

75. Id.
76. See Brady, supra note 53, at 173.
77.

David Emmert et al., Leading Schools Legally: A Practical Anthology of School Law 136
(2005).

78. See Thomas, Cambron-McCabe & McCarthy, supra note 1, at 225–34.
79. See Underwood & Webb, supra note 13, at 173–74; see also Thomas, Cambron-McCabe &

McCarthy, supra note 1, at 230.
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board.80 In contrast, a school district must still provide educational services to
students who receive special education services.81
		

2. Zero Tolerance Policies

In the late 1980s and early 1990s, public schools began to move away from a
rehabilitative model of discipline to a stricter approach.82 This movement was likely
in reaction to the public perception that American schools were becoming more
violent. The result was a move by school districts to adopt zero tolerance policies.83 A
zero tolerance school policy generally applies a prescribed, mandatory sanction—
typically expulsion or suspension—for an infraction with minimal, if any,
consideration given to the circumstances or consequences of the offense.84
The rhetoric of zero tolerance created the impression of dramatic increases in
school violence, thereby increasing public support for more drastic remedies.
Predictably, Congress responded to such pressure by passing the Gun-Free Schools
Act of 1994 (the “Act”).85 The Act requires each state that receives federal funds to
expel any student who possesses a firearm on school grounds for at least one year.86
This Act allows the chief administrative officer of the school district to adjust the
punishment at his or her discretion on a case-by-case basis.87 The Act also states that
special education students expelled for gun possession may be placed in alternative
instructional programs.88
As a result of the Act, states have implemented legislation related to guns on
school property to various degrees. In fact, soon after the Act was passed, all fifty
states and the District of Columbia enacted zero tolerance policies.89 Many school
administrators expanded the scope of legitimate school expulsion under the Act.
Specifically, schools began to apply zero tolerance policies for violations other than
firearms possession, including the use of drugs or behaviors that fall loosely under the
category of school disruption, such as fist fighting and verbal abuse. For example,
80. See Thomas, Cambron-McCabe & McCarthy, supra note 1, at 213.
81.

Id.

82. Insley, supra note 52, at 1045.
83. Lawrence F. Rossow & Jacqueline A. Stefkovich, Education Law: Cases and Materials 497

(2005).

84. See generally Zero Tolerance Task Force, supra note 47, at 852.
85. Gun-Free Schools Act of 1994, 20 U.S.C. § 8921 (2000) (repealed 2002).
86. Id.
87.

See id. § 8921(b)(1). The exception states: “State law shall allow the chief administering officer of such
local educational agency to modify such expulsion requirement for a student on a case-by-case basis.” Id.

88. See Id. § 8921. The No Child Left Behind Act of 2003 (“NCLB”) included similar language regarding

zero tolerance policies involving weapons and drugs in schools. See also Gun Free Schools Act, 20
U.S.C. § 7151 (2006).

89. See Insley, supra note 52, at 1047 n.46.
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under Colorado’s zero tolerance law, students can be expelled for willful disobedience,
persistent defiance of authority, or the destruction or defacement of school property.90
Some observers contend that these zero tolerance policies result in the expulsion
of students for non-violent acts that may typically be considered relatively minor
violations.91 For example, an honor roll student was expelled for accidentally bringing
her mother’s lunch to school, which contained a paring knife.92 Accordingly, zero
tolerance policies have been opposed by professional associations such as the American
Bar Association, which approved a resolution opposing zero tolerance policies in
schools,93 and the American Psychological Association.
Courts in a few instances have also struck down zero tolerance policies. For
example, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit struck down one school
district’s zero tolerance policy, reasoning that “suspending or expelling a student for
weapons possession, even if the student did not knowingly possess any weapon”
would violate substantive due process.94 In this case, the student found a friend’s
knife in the glove compartment of the student’s car while the car was parked on
school property.95 The student asserted that he had no knowledge about the knife.96
The court reasoned that:
[T]he Board may not absolve itself of its obligation legal and moral, to
determine whether students intentionally committed the acts for which their
expulsions are sought by hiding behind a zero tolerance policy that purports
to make the student’s knowledge a non-issue.97

Generally, however, courts rarely strike down zero tolerance policies.98
		

3. Discipline and Off-Campus Activities

Some states and cities have imposed discipline upon students for criminal activity
that occurs off-campus and the courts have generally allowed such policies. For
example, under a Texas statute, if a student has been convicted of a felony, has
received deferred prosecution for committing a felony, or if the superintendent has
reason to believe the student committed a felony, the student can be placed in an
90. See Colo. Rev. Stat. § 22-33-106 (2000).
91.

See Insley, supra note 52, at 1051; see also Solari & Balshaw, supra note 22, at 149.

92.

See Insley, supra note 52, at 1040.

93.

Ralph C. Martin, II, Am. Bar Assoc., Zero Tolerance Policy 3 (2001), available at http://www.
abanet.org/crimjust/juvjus/zerotolreport.html.

94. Seal v. Morgan, 229 F.3d 567, 575 (6th Cir. 2000).
95. Id. at 571.
96. Id. at 572.
97.

Id. at 581.

98. But see Ratner ex rel. Haney v. Loudoun County Pub. Sch., 16 Fed. App’x. 140, 142 (4th Cir. 2001)

(stating that “federal courts are not properly called upon to judge the wisdom of a zero tolerance policy
of the sort alleged to be in place . . . .”).
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alternative education placement.99 Similarly, Chicago has adopted a public school
policy calling for the expulsion of students who commit violent acts on weekends off
of school property.100 Although courts have permitted school officials to discipline
students for off-campus behavior,101 officials generally may not do so unless they can
prove that the off-campus activity has created a substantial disruption in the
school.102
The courts have begun to address whether discipline for off-campus activities is
legal. The Eighth Circuit, in Stephenson v. Davenport Community School District,
reasoned that if a school district wants to discipline students for outside gang-related
activity, “the District must ‘define with some care’ the ‘gang related activities’ it
wishes students to avoid.” 103 In Stephenson, a student alleged that she was
unconstitutionally required to remove a tattoo as was required under the school
district’s policy prohibiting gang symbols.104 The student claimed that the tattoo was
not gang-related.105 She also argued that the policy as it referred to “gang” was vague,
and the court agreed.106 The Superior Court of Delaware, in Howard v. Colonial
School District, upheld a school district’s policy on off-campus crime, finding
permissible the expulsion of a student for selling drugs off-campus.107 The student in
Howard had sold cocaine to an undercover police officer during the summer.108 The
court did not find that the board’s decision to expel the student was without “authority
or justification.”109 It has been noted, however, that not all off-campus, non-school
activity conduct would subject a student to the threat of expulsion.110 The conduct
occurring off-campus and after school hours must directly affect the order of the
school.111 It should also be noted that the discipline for students for off-campus crime
varies by state.

99. Tex. Educ. Code Ann. § 37.006 (Vernon 1999).
100. Jacquelyn Heard, Off-Campus Crime Spells Expulsion from School, Chi. Trib., Mar. 11, 1997, at S1.
101. See J.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847, 847 (Pa. 2002).
102. See Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 496 F. Supp. 2d 587, 599 (W.D. Pa. 2007); Mahaffey v. Aldrich,

236 F. Supp. 2d 779, 785 (E.D. Mich. 2002); Beussink v. Woodland R-IV Sch. Dist., 30 F. Supp. 2d
1175, 1180 (E.D. Mo. 1998).

103. Stephenson v. Davenport Cmty. Sch. Dist., 110 F.3d 1303, 1310 (8th Cir. 1997).
104. Id. at 1304–06.
105. Id. at 1304.
106. Id. at 1308–11
107. See Howard v. Colonial Sch. Dist., 621 A.2d 362, 366 (Del. Super. Ct. 1992).
108. Id. at 363.
109. Id. at 366.
110. See Bunger v. Iowa High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 197 N.W.2d 555, 563–64 (Iowa 1972).
111. Id.
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III.	Status of Research and Case Law with Respect to RACIAL
DisproportionaliTy in Discipline

One criticism of zero tolerance policies is that they disproportionately impact
students of color. Those opposed to zero tolerance for this reason argue that zero
tolerance policies: 1) do not effectively balance safety with educational opportunity
for all, and 2) “create a ‘schoolhouse-to-jailhouse’ pathway” for minority students.112
Likewise, the Justice Policy Institute and the Children’s Law Center assert that these
policies are creating “funnels for the juvenile justice system.”113
Studies have demonstrated that a disproportionate number of students who are
expelled from school are from low-income families or are students of color.114 For
example, Donald Stone reported that black students were either suspended or
expelled at a rate 250% higher than the rate at which white students are expelled.115
In this empirical study, Stone surveyed thirty-five school divisions representing a
population of 1,382,562 students about information relating to school suspensions.
Within this population, 46% of the student body was white, 44% was black, and 10%
was made up of other races. Even though the black and white population was almost
equal, the study found that when examining suspension rates, 71.5% of the suspended
students were black and 28.5% were white.116 The study did not note if the offenses
were different or more severe between the different racial groups, but it did indicate
that the most common offenses included fighting, cursing, weapons on campus, and
skipping class.117 Similarly, Wu found that when socioeconomic indicators are held
constant, black students were still disciplined at higher rates than white students.118
Students of color are also disproportionately represented in discipline related to offcampus crimes.119
The right not to be discriminated against on the basis of race, color, or national
origin is protected by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment120
and explicitly guaranteed by Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.121 Specifically,
section 601 of Title VI “prohibits discrimination based on race, color, or national
origin in covered programs and activities.”122 Section 602 of Title VI authorizes
112. See Solari & Balshaw, supra note 22, at 149–50.
113. See Insley, supra note 52, at 1070.
114. See Brady, supra note 53, at 167–68; see also Adira Siman, Challenging Zero Tolerance: Federal and State

Legal Remedies for Students of Color, 14 Cornell J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 327, 333–35 (2005).

115. Donald H. Stone, Crime and Punishment in Public Schools: An Empirical Study of Disciplinary Proceedings,

17 Am. J. Trial Advoc. 351, 366 (1993).

116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Wu, supra note 30.
119. See Solari & Balshaw, supra note 22, at 171.
120. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
121. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2006).
122. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 275 (2001).

1086

VOLUME 54 | 2009/10

NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW

federal agencies to effectuate section 601 through the issuance of regulations.123 In
the following sections, we examine the scientific research and case law regarding
racial and ethnic disparities in school discipline. Within the demands that educational
interventions are non-discriminatory, to what extent can it be demonstrated that
school discipline is fair or unfair? What response have courts had to claims of
discrimination in school discipline?
A. Scientific Research on Racial/Ethnic Disproportionality in School Discipline

For over thirty years, in national, state, district, and building level data, the
documentation of disciplinary overrepresentation for African American students has
been highly consistent.124 Recent analyses have found rates of out-of school
suspensions between two to three times greater for African American elementary
school students than white students,125 although findings of Latino disparities have
been somewhat less consistent.126
Over-exposure to exclusionary school discipline places racially and ethnically
diverse students at increased risk for a range of negative outcomes. Given the strong
and robust finding that the amount of time engaged in academic settings is among
the strongest predictors of achievement,127 disproportionate exclusion of students of
color increases their risk of lower academic success. Disproportionate representation
in exclusionary discipline is also troubling given the generally negative outcomes that
have been found to be associated with the use of out-of-school suspension and
expulsion. The data indicate that minority students are being disproportionately
exposed to interventions that increase disciplinary recidivism,128 negatively predict

123. Id.
124. See Wash. Research Project, Children’s Def. Fund, School Suspensions: Are they Helping

Children? (1975); McCarthy & Hoge, supra note 38, at 1101–20; Russell J. Skiba, et al., The Color of
Discipline: Sources of Racial and Gender Disproportionality in School Punishment, 34 Urban Rev. 317, 317–42
(2002) [hereinafter The Color of Discipline]; Wu, supra note 30, at 245–303; Janice L. Streitmatter, Ethnic/
Racial and Gender Equity in School Suspensions, 68 High Sch. J. 139, 139–43 (1985–1986).

125. Linda M. Raffaele Mendez, Howard M. Knoff & John M. Ferron, School Demographic Variables and

Out-of-School Suspension Rates: A Quantitative and Qualitative Analysis of a Large, Ethnically Diverse
School District, 39 Psychol. Sch. 259, 261 (2002); Skiba & Rausch, supra note 16, at 1073.

126. Rebecca Gordon, Libero Della Piana & Terry Keleher, Facing the Consequences: An

Examination of Racial Discrimination in U.S. Public Schools (2000).

127. Jere E. Brophy, Research Linking Teacher Behavior to Student Achievement: Potential Implications for

Instruction of Chapter 1 Students, 23 Educ. Psychol. 235, 235–86 (1988); Margaret C. Wang, Geneva
D. Haertel & Herbert J. Walberg, Learning Influences, in Psychology and Educational Practice
199, 199–211 (Herbert J. Walberg & Geneva D. Haertel eds., 1997).

128. Tary Tobin, George Sugai & Geoff Colvin, Patterns in Middle School Discipline Records, 4 J. Emotional

& Behav. Disorders 82, 82–94 (1996).
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school achievement,129 and in the long-term, are associated with higher rates of
school dropout130 and increased contact with the juvenile justice system.131
		

1. Socioeconomic Status.

		

2. Disparate Rates of Disruption.

Race and socioeconomic status (“SES”) are unfortunately highly connected in
American society.132 This connection suggests that apparent racial disproportionality
in school discipline could be simply a by-product of disproportionality associated
with SES. Statistical analyses have indeed found low SES to be a risk factor for
school suspension.133 Yet multivariate statistical models have also shown that
nonwhite students still report and experience significantly higher suspension rates
than white students, even after statistically controlling for poverty.134 Thus, although
economic disadvantage may contribute to disproportionate rates of discipline for
students of color, it cannot completely explain racial and ethnic disparities in school
suspension and expulsion.
Implicit in the poverty hypothesis is the assumption that African American
students may engage in higher rates of disruptive behavior than other students. Yet
investigations of student behavior, race, and discipline have yielded no evidence that
African American over-representation in school suspension is due to higher rates of
misbehavior, regardless of whether the data are self-reported,135 or based on analysis
of disciplinary records.136 If anything, studies have shown that African American
students are punished more severely for less serious or more subjective infractions.
Ann McFadden and her colleagues reported that black pupils in a Florida school
district were more likely than white students to receive severe punishments (e.g.,
corporal punishment, school suspension) and less likely to receive milder consequences

129. Skiba & Rausch, supra note 16.
130. See Ekstrom, supra note 41, at 53.
131. Wald & Losen, supra note 8.
132. See generally Vonnie C. McLoyd, Socioeconomic Disadvantage and Child Development, 53 Am. Psychol.

185, 185–204 (1998); Nat’l Ass’n of Secondary Sch. Principals, Statement on civil rights implications of
zero tolerance programs (Feb. 2000) (Testimony presented to the United States Commission on Civil
Rights, Washington, D.C.).

133. Ellen Brantlinger, Social Class Distinctions in Adolescents’ Reports of Problems and Punishment in School, 17

Behav. Disorders 36 (1991).

134. Contributions of School Discipline, supra note 29, at 7; John M. Wallace, Jr. et al., Racial, Ethnic, and

Gender Differences in School Discipline Among U.S. High School Students: 1991–2005, 59 Negro Educ.
Rev. 47 (2008); Wu, supra note 30.

135. See Rachel Dinkes, et al., Indicators of School Crime and Safety: 2007 (2007), available at

http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2008/2008021.pdf.

136. The Color of Discipline, supra note 124.
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(e.g., in-school suspension).137 These results are consistent with findings that African
American students are referred for corporal punishment for less serious behavior
than are other students.138
Some evidence suggests that the over-representation of African American
students in school exclusion begins with racial disparities in rates of office referrals
from classroom teachers.139 In a study specifically devoted to African American
disproportionality in school discipline, Russell Skiba and his colleagues found that
white students were referred to the office significantly more frequently for offenses
that appear more capable of objective documentation: smoking, vandalism, leaving
without permission, and obscene language.140 In contrast, African American students
were referred more often for disrespect, excessive noise, threat, and loitering, behaviors
that would seem to require more subjective judgment.141 In short, there is no evidence
that racial disparities in school discipline can be explained through higher rates of
disruption among African American students. Although much more investigation is
necessary to better understand all the factors that contribute to racial disparities in
school discipline, the evidence suggests that these disparities are caused at least in
part by cultural mismatch or insufficient training in culturally responsive classroom
management practices.142
B. Case Law Regarding Racial/Ethnic Disparities in Discipline

The courts have become involved in school cases concerning racially
disproportionate discipline actions in a few instances. Before examining individual
cases, this section will first explain the legal avenues that students rely upon when
filing such claims against school districts.
One avenue for students of color who assert such claims is the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.143 The Equal Protection Clause states that
“No State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws.”144 Under this Clause, courts apply different tests depending on school
officials’ motivation for taking action. If school officials are motivated by legitimate
educational considerations, then the court will apply a rational basis test, asking
137. Anne C. McFadden & George E. Marsh, A Study of Race and Gender Bias in the Punishment of School

Children, 15 Educ. & Treatment Child. 140, 140–47 (1992).

138. Steven R. Shaw & Jeffery P. Braden, Race and Gender Bias in the Administration of Corporal Punishment,

19 Sch. Psychol. Rev. 378, 380 (1990).

139. See Frances Vavrus & KimMarie Cole, “I Didn’t Do Nothin’:” The Discursive Construction of School

Suspension, 34 Urban Rev. 87, 87, 111 (2002).

140. The Color of Discipline, supra note 124.
141. Id.
142. Ann Arnett Ferguson, Bad Boys: Public Schools and the Making of Black Masculinity 2

(2001); Brenda L. Townsend, Disproportionate Discipline of African American Learners: Reducing School
Suspension and Expulsions, 66 Exceptional Child. 381 (2000).

143. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
144. Id.
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whether the school officials’ actions are reasonably related to these legitimate
educational reasons.145 This test is generally considered deferential to school
administrators.146 It is born out of a notion that government officials are the experts
in how best to conduct their business.147 Therefore, courts should not seek to impose
their own judgments on the decisions of governmental actors, as long as there is a
reasonable basis for the decision. If, however, school officials are motivated by racial
animus, then courts will apply strict scrutiny.148 Under this test, school officials must
supply a compelling justification for their actions and those actions must be narrowly
tailored to advancing the compelling justifications.149 This heightened scrutiny,
however, does not apply, for example, if non-racially motivated actions produce a
disparate impact on the educational opportunities of black students.150 If black
students are disciplined at much higher rates than white students, but these disparities
are shown to be based on racially neutral decision making by school officials, then
the disparity is not considered unconstitutional racial discrimination. Instead, it is
simply the unfortunate result of the application of legitimate decision making by
educational officials.151
Another claim that students assert in school disciplinary cases involving racial
discrimination comes under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.152 Title VI
prohibits discrimination on the basis of “race, color, or national origin . . . under any
programs or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.”153 When plaintiffs use
Title VI they may assert that school disciplinary practices result in disparate treatment
of students of color. Disparate treatment requires the student to demonstrate that
school officials acted intentionally in creating the inequitable environment.154 The
145. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 37–40 (1973).
146. See id.
147. The Court has long recognized that local school boards have broad discretion in the management of

school affairs. See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 864 (1982) (“We are therefore in full
agreement with petitioners that local school boards must be permitted ‘to establish and apply their
curriculum in such a way as to transmit community values,’ and that ‘there is a legitimate and substantial
community interest in promoting respect for authority and traditional values be they social, moral, or
political.’”) (citations omitted); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968) (“[P]ublic education in
our Nation is committed to the control of state and local authorities,” and federal courts should not
ordinarily “intervene in the resolution of conflicts which arise in the daily operation of school systems.”);
Meyer v. Nebraska, 292 U.S. 390, 402 (1923); Pierce v. Society of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus
and Mary, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507
(1969) (we have “repeatedly emphasized . . . the comprehensive authority of the States and of school
officials . . . to prescribe and control conduct in the schools.”).

148. Valeria v. Davis, 307 F.3d 1036, 1042 (9th Cir. 2002).
149. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237 (1995).
150. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976).
151. Pauken & Daniel, supra note 55, at 759–64.
152. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VI, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2006).
153. Id.
154. Pauken & Daniel, supra note 55, at 759.
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Supreme Court has held that disparate treatment under Title VI is, therefore, similar
to racial discrimination recognized under the Equal Protection Clause in that the
student must demonstrate that the school officials acted with discriminatory intent.155
In order to prove intent, the plaintiff must demonstrate that a “challenged action was
motivated by an intent to discriminate,”156 and plaintiffs may present evidence of
intent that is direct or circumstantial.157 As a result of the intent requirement, it is
difficult for students to bring successful Title VI actions. The Harvard Civil Rights
Project and the Advancement Project contend that Title VI has been “ineffective and
[is] rarely enforced” in discipline cases.158
In the past, the Title VI regulations provided some assistance to students alleging
racial discrimination in school discipline cases under a disparate impact claim.
Disparate impact occurs when students demonstrate that a facially neutral policy has
a negative impact on a protected class of students.159 Specifically, while a successful
argument under Title VI requires intentional discrimination, its accompanying
regulations permitted a broader interpretation of the law, allowing plaintiffs to argue
disparate impact.160 In earlier cases, the U.S. Supreme Court also found that these
regulations may prohibit discrimination that has a disparate impact on protected
groups—even if there was no evidence of intentional discrimination.161 As will be
discussed, however, private rights of actions under Title VI regulations were
foreclosed by the 2001 U.S. Supreme Court case Alexander v. Sandoval.162
Other students claiming that school disciplinary actions are racially discriminatory
have relied on section 1981 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866.163 In the past, students
have also included a section 1983 claim in discipline cases involving discrimination.164
Both section 1981 and section 1983 were passed following the Civil War in order to
eliminate racial discriminatory policies. Enacted as part of the Civil Rights Act of
1866, section 1981 prohibits discrimination on the basis of race in both the right to
engage in certain legal action and the right to contract.165 Additionally, it enables the
155. See Guardians Ass’n v. Civil Serv. Comm’n of New York City, 463 U.S. 582, 610–12, 642 (1983).
156. Elston v. Talladega County Bd. of Educ., 997 F.2d 1394, 1406 (11th Cir. 1993).
157. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Title VI Legal Manual (1998), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/

grants_statutes/legalman.php.

158. The Civil Rights Project, supra note 21, at vi.
159. See Kevin Welner, Alexander v. Sandoval: A Setback for Civil Rights, 9 Educ. Pol’y Analysis Archives

24 (2001), available at http://epaa.asu.edu/epaa/v9n24.html.

160. See id. Title VI permits federal agencies to create regulations and rules to achieve Title VI’s objectives.

Title VI Legal Manual, supra note 157. In promulgating these regulations, the U.S. Department of
Justice, in addition to prohibiting intentional discrimination, also banned unintentional disparate
impact discrimination. Id.

161. See Welner, supra note 159.
162. 532 U.S. 275 (2001).
163. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2006).
164. Id. § 1983.
165. Id. § 1981.

1091

AFRICAN AMERICAN DISPROPORTIONALITY IN SCHOOL DISCIPLINE

person experiencing the discrimination to sue both public and private parties166 and
it provides that people within the United States’ jurisdiction are accountable to all
laws and regulations.167 Only five years later, in the Civil Rights Act of 1871,
Congress passed section 1983, which provided civil remedies, including the collection
of monetary damages, for civil rights violations.168 Section 1983 is now used to collect
money damages when a government actor violates a statutory or constitutional
provision, including, but not limited to, Equal Protection, the First Amendment,
and the Due Process Clause.169
The cases below illustrate how these four claims have played out in courts across
the nation. In most cases, the courts have given great discretion to school officials in
matters of discipline. Additionally, statistical evidence of disproportionate discipline
of minority students has rarely been sufficient in and of itself to result in findings in
favor of the plaintiffs. It is important to note that several of the earlier cases presented
below would have been decided differently if heard today, due to the impact of the
Washington v. Davis170 and Alexander v. Sandoval171 decisions, discussed below.
		

1. Deference to School Officials

Although black student plaintiffs were successful in an early case challenging a
school district’s disciplinary practice,172 a Texas federal district court specifically
noted in Hawkins v. Coleman that it had no intention of interfering with school
officials’ discretion in disciplinary actions.173 In Hawkins, the court found that black
students were being suspended more often than white students, which was a result of
“institutional racism” within the school.174 Expert witnesses presented statistical
evidence that black students were suspended at a significantly higher frequency when
white administrators controlled the school district.175 Relying on this expert
166. See id.
167. Ronald D. Rotunda & John E. Nowak, 4 Treatise on Constitutional Law: Substance and

Procedure § 19.10 (4th ed. 2008); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1981.

168. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
169. Rotunda & Nowak, supra note 167, §§ 19.13–19.17; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
170. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
171. 532 U.S. 275 (2001).
172. Hawkins v. Coleman, 376 F. Supp. 1330, 1337 (N.D. Tex. 1974).
173. Id. at 1338.
174. Id. at 1334; see also Tasby v. Estes, 643 F.2d 1103 (5th Cir. 1981); Parker v. Trinity High Sch., 823 F.

Supp. 511 (N.D. Ill. 1993).

175. See Hawkins, 376 F. Supp. at 1336. The expert witness testified that:

[The Dallas Independent School District] is a “white controlled institution” with
“institutional racism” existing in the operation of its discipline procedures. A “white
controlled institution” occurs . . . when a large majority of the decisions about resource
distribution is made by white administrators. “Institutional racism” exists . . . when the
standard operating procedures of an institution are prejudiced against, derogatory to, or
unresponsive to the needs of a particular racial group. This is distinguished from

1092

VOLUME 54 | 2009/10

NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW

testimony, the judge ordered the school district to create a program that addressed
the issue of disproportionality in the school district.176 While the court stated that
“there must be a real effort on the part of everyone involved” to eliminate the negative
effects of “white institutional racism,” it also reasoned that it “has no intention of
taking from the School Board or the Superintendent and other officials the running
of the schools.”177 Thus, even though the court agreed that school disciplinary
practices were racially discriminatory, the court did not wish to interfere with school
officials’ discretion to discipline students, stating that “No court can decree a change
in attitude. That is something within the individual. Put briefly, there must be a real
effort on the part of everyone involved to accentuate the positive while at the same
time eliminating the negative effects of ‘white institutional racism.’”178
One year later in Sweet v. Childs, a group of black students sued school
administrators, the school board, and various state officials under sections 1981 and
1983, and the Equal Protection Clause, claiming that school officials engaged in
racial discrimination when disciplining them.179 The district court granted the school
district’s motion for summary judgment.180 On appeal, the black students argued that
school officials violated the Equal Protection Clause because more black students
had been disciplined than white students.181 The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed, finding that there was no evidence of “arbitrary suspensions,” or that black
students were disciplined more frequently than white students.182 The allegations
against the state officials were also dismissed since any failure to act was not
proximately related to the alleged discrimination in this case.183 Unlike the decision
in Hawkins, the court did not find evidence of discrimination in this case, but similar
to that decision, the court reasoned that disciplinary matters are for local school
authorities to decide.184 Together, these decisions demonstrate the reluctance of
courts to interfere with school disciplinary matters.

“personal racism” which exists within a given individual and do not become involved in
the administration of an institution’s normal operations.

Id. at 1336.

176. Id. at 1337–38.
177. Id. at 1338.
178. Id.
179. 507 F.2d 675, 677–78 (5th Cir. 1975).
180. Id. at 680.
181. Id. at 680–81.
182. Id. at 681.
183. Id. at 680.
184. Id.
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2. Statistical Evidence as Proof of Intention to Discriminate

		

3. Statistical Evidence as Insufficient Proof of Discrimination

Although the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Washington v. Davis does not
involve a school disciplinary matter, it is sometimes cited in school discipline cases,
as it highlights the difficulty of demonstrating school officials’ intention to
discriminate.185 In Davis, the plaintiffs used statistical evidence to document the
racial disparities that existed in a job-related test used for prospective police recruits.186
Specifically, plaintiffs argued that the tests excluded a disproportionate number of
black applicants: white applicants passed the employment test in much greater
numbers than did black applicants.187 The Court did not find the test in practice to
violate the law because the test was not motivated by a discriminatory purpose,
explaining that a test is not unconstitutional merely because it produces a
disproportionately adverse effect on a racial group.188 The Court held that
“disproportionate impact is not irrelevant, but it is not the sole touchstone of an
invidious racial discrimination forbidden by the Constitution.”189 Although, as a
result of Washington, some courts have required that students use statistical data
when trying to prove that school officials intended to discriminate, this decision and
others190 demonstrate that statistical evidence showing that black students are
disciplined more harshly or frequently than white students does not necessarily result
in a verdict for the plaintiffs.191
One early application of the Washington v. Davis decision occurred in a 1981
discipline case. In Tasby v. Estes, parents of black students sought injunctive relief
from the school district’s discipline practices, arguing that black students were
punished more harshly than white students.192 The plaintiffs relied on the experts’
testimony that black students were disciplined more frequently than white and
Mexican American students, statistical evidence demonstrating that black students
received the most extreme forms of punishment as compared to other student
populations in the school, and data linking such disciplinary disparity with an
imbalance between the race of school personnel and the race of the students.193
185. See Washington, 426 U.S. at 229.
186. Id. at 260.
187. See id. at 245.
188. See id. at 242.
189. Id.
190. See, e.g., City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980); Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous.

Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977).

191. Tasby, 643 F.2d at 1108. The recent U.S. Supreme Court case, Ricci v. Destefano, may also reinforce this

trend. 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2674–75 (2009) (holding that a city may not reject “test results solely because the
higher scoring candidates were white.”).

192. Tasby, 643 F.2d at 1104–07.
193. Id. at 1107.
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The district court dismissed the case because the parents did not present evidence
that such statistical disparities constituted racial discrimination.194 On appeal, the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the parents failed to
demonstrate that school officials were motivated by a discriminatory purpose when
they disciplined the black students.195 Citing the Sweet and Davis decisions, the court
did not find that the statistically disproportionate punishment was a result of the
requisite discriminatory intent.196
Although the court found the plaintiffs’ evidence reflected a significant racial
disparity, it did not agree that the data demonstrated that black students received
harsher punishment than white students for the offenses, all factors being equal.197
The court noted that evidence demonstrating a disparate impact was an “important
starting point” but that this evidence has “limited probative value.”198 Specifically the
court reasoned that:
[T]he statistics offered are based upon a breakdown of offenses far too general
to prove disproportionate severity in punishment. The statistical list of
offenses includes cutting class, disobedience, profanity, fighting, and throwing
objects. But these categories do not sufficiently permit comparison of the
severity of any particular instance of misconduct with that of any other . . .
the statistics do not reflect other relevant circumstances surrounding each
individual case of punishment for these general infractions.199

The Tasby case thus demonstrates the need for plaintiffs to offer more specific and
measurable evidence to support the claim that students of color are being treated
differently than white students.
In other cases, courts have found in favor of school districts even though there
was evidence that the black students received harsher treatment because the student
could not demonstrate that the school district’s actions were based on racially
discriminatory motives. In the 1983 case Coleman v. Franklin Parish School Board,
black parents alleged violations of the Equal Protection Clause, section 1981, and
section 1983 for racial discrimination after a teacher struck their child. 200 The parents
noted that the white student involved in horseplay with their son was not disciplined
and argued that the defendants intended to discriminate.201 However, the parents
failed to present statistical evidence demonstrating that the school district’s discipline
policies had a disparate impact on black students.202 The court held that “the equal
194. Id. at 1105–06.
195. Id. at 1108.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 1107 n.1.
198. Id. at 1108.
199. Id. at 1107 n.1.
200. Coleman ex rel. Coleman v. Franklin Parish Sch. Bd., 702 F.2d 74 (5th Cir. 1983).
201. Id. at 75.
202. Id. at 75–77.
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protection clause is not violated solely because an action has a racially disproportionate
impact if it is not motivated by a racially discriminatory purpose.” 203 The Equal
Protection issue was remanded.204
Similarly, in Parker v. Trinity High School, a mother on behalf of two black
students alleged that a private school unfairly expelled the students for fighting when
white students who engaged in the same offense, or more serious offenses, were not
expelled. 205 The students brought their lawsuit under section 1981(a), which requires
students to demonstrate intentional and purposeful discrimination to prevail. 206
Although the court noted that discriminatory intent could be inferred from statistical
evidence, the plaintiffs failed to introduce this evidence.207 As a result, the court did
not find evidence of racial motivation.208
		

4. Evidence of Both Individual and Statistical Discrepancies

On the contrary, in Sherpell v. Humnoke School District, the court found that a
school district’s assertive discipline program was intentionally discriminatory without
relying on statistical evidence. 209 In this case, the plaintiffs alleged that racial
discrimination existed in the school’s discipline policy.210 The federal district court in
Arkansas found that the school’s disciplinary practices were harsher for black students
than for white students.211 The court did not elaborate on the different infractions
that were involved, but it did focus its criticism on the way school officials had
implemented the assertive discipline program.212 For example, it found that school
officials did not establish any uniform standards to help the teachers administer
discipline in an objective way: Where one teacher might discipline a student in one
class for an infraction, in another class the behavior might be deemed acceptable.213
Thus, the subjective manner in which the policy was implemented “provides a
protective cover” for “unconstitutional conduct.”214 As a result, the court found that
black students were punished for offenses that white students were not, and it ordered
203. Id. at 77.
204. Id.
205. Parker, 823 F. Supp. at 512.
206. Id. at 519.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 520.
209. 619 F. Supp. 670, 677 (E.D. Ark. 1985). Assertive discipline programs are programs intended to

maintain classroom order by setting up consistent classroom disciplinary procedures across a school. Id.
at 675.

210. Id.
211. See id. at 677.
212. See id.
213. Id.
214. Id.
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a bi-racial committee to address the problems with the school district’s discipline
policies.215
One explanation for the different outcome of this case than other cases that lack
statistical evidence relates to the historical context of this particular school district.
Prior to 1968, the school district “operated under a separate, but equal concept,”216
and this intense racially discriminatory atmosphere permeated the district. As a
result, in addition to the discipline policy, several other aspects of the school operated
in a discriminatory way.217 Thus, the court may have been more easily persuaded by
the plaintiffs’ arguments, even though it did not rely on specific statistical evidence.
In a more recent case, a federal district court rejected the students’ use of statistics
to prove discriminatory intent.218 In Fuller v. Board of Education School District, six
black high school students were expelled for two years for fighting at a high school
football game.219 The fight injured seven other people in the stands. 220 The students
argued that their expulsion was racially motivated.221 The students also argued that
the district expels a disparate number of black students.222 A summary introduced to
the court indicated that whereas 82% of the students expelled between 1996 and
1999 were black, black students comprise about 46–48% of the student body
population.223
A district court upheld the school board’s two-year expulsion, which did not
provide for an alternative education placement setting.224 Regarding the students’ Equal
Protection and Title VI claim, the students presented statistics related to their claim of
racial discrimination.225 The court did note that the statistics presented could lead a
“reasonable person to speculate that the School Board’s expulsion action was based
upon the race of the students.”226 However, the court further reasoned that “none of the
Caucasian students who were expelled for physical confrontations or fighting can be
considered ‘similarly situated’ to the students involved in this case” because of the
215. Id.
216. Id. at 672.
217. Id. at 680–81.
218. Fuller v. Decatur Pub. Sch. Bd. of Educ., 78 F. Supp. 2d 812, 815 (C.D. Ill. 2000).
219. Id. at 816–19.
220. Id. at 814.
221. Id. at 814, 824–25. This case received extensive media coverage, commentary by the Reverend Jesse

Jackson and Illinois Governor George Ryan who both criticized the school district’s handling of the
matter, and a march in the community protesting the expulsions that received national attention.
Reverend Jackson was allowed to address the school board about the length of the expulsions. Id. at
818–19.

222. Id. at 823.
223. Id. at 824.
224. Id. at 814.
225. See id. at 815.
226. Id. at 824.
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magnitude of this particular fight.227 Thus, the court did not find that the evidence
established that the black students were treated differently than white students.
The judge found that statistics and anecdotal evidence alone do not prove racial
discrimination and that the court cannot make a decision based on “statistical
speculation.”228 The court also emphasized that the statistics that were presented at
trial were never presented to the school board during the expulsion hearings and
were only created as a result of a court order.229 It further reasoned that the law is
clear in that statistics alone cannot prove racial discrimination and a violation of
Equal Protection; the plaintiffs needed to show that similarly situated students were
not expelled for the same conduct.230 After this ruling, however, the school board
reduced the expulsions to one year with an option for the students to attend an
alternative school.231
		

5. The Impact of Sandoval on Disparate Impact Cases

A 2001 U.S. Supreme Court decision made it even more difficult for students of
color to successfully prove discrimination in school discipline policies.232 Alexander v.
Sandoval was not a school discipline case, but it has had an impact on school discipline
cases that is worth noting. Sandoval involved an amendment to Alabama’s State
Constitution, which made English the official language of the state.233 The Alabama
Department of Public Safety (the “Department”) created an English-only driver’s
license test.234 Sandoval did not speak English. Relying on Title VI regulations, she
sued the Department and others, arguing that the driver’s license test had a disparate
impact on those people born outside the U.S.235 Sandoval argued that the Englishonly policy discriminated against those who did not speak English because of its
disparate impact.236 The Court found that there is no private implied cause of action
to enforce disparate-impact regulations of Title VI.237 The Supreme Court held that
the regulations are “in considerable tension” with Title VI which requires proof of
intentional discrimination. 238 This case is significant because before the Sandoval
decision, plaintiffs could file disparate impact lawsuits under the regulations of Title
227. Id. at 825.
228. Id. at 824.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 825.
231. Id. at 819.
232. See Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 275.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 278–80.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 291–93.
238. Id. at 282.
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VI instead of demonstrating discriminatory intent as required by the substantive
provisions of Title VI. Without a private right of action, enforcement of Title VI
regulations is now left solely to the federal government.239
Justice Stevens’s dissent in Sandoval argued that litigants could rely on section
1983 to enforce the Title VI regulations against state actors.240 In 2002, however, the
U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Gonzaga University v. Doe cast serious doubt on
the section 1983 strategy.241 Further, three federal appellate courts since the Sandoval
decision have held that no private cause of action is available under section 1983 to
enforce Title VI’s disparate impact regulations.242
		

6. Conclusion

Review of the case law reveals that in order to successfully challenge racial/ethnic
disparities in discipline policies and practices of schools under existing federal law,
students must generally prove that school officials were motivated by discriminatory
intent when they adopted or implemented them. Under the Equal Protection Clause,
heightened scrutiny only applies to governmental actions motivated by intentional
racial decision making.243 Thus, disparate impact alone in a public school’s disciplinary
practices is insufficient to generate strict scrutiny. 244 Federal courts generally
determine the constitutionality of racially neutral policies and practices that generate
a disparate impact by the deferential rational basis test. 245 The determination of
illegal race/ethnic discrimination under Title VI mirrors the Equal Protection
Clause. As a result, to demonstrate race discrimination by a public school’s disciplinary
policies and practices under Title VI also requires that challengers prove that the
adoption and implementation of the polices were motivated by racial animus.246 The
implementing regulations under Title VI, as opposed to Title VI, do allow for the
establishment of racial/ethnic discrimination by proving disparate impact, even in
the absence of discriminatory intent.247 However, the Supreme Court has noted that
the disparate impact regulations under Title VI are in considerable tension with
Title VI.248 In addition, the Supreme Court in its 2001 decision in Sandoval concluded
that private rights of action to enforce the implementing regulations of Title VI do
239. See Christopher Dunn, Time to Fix the Race-Racial Discrimination Protections of the Civil Rights Act of

1964, N.Y.L. J. (2009), available at www.nyclu.org/node/2256.

240. See Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 301 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
241. 536 U.S. 273, 285–86 (2002).
242. See id. at 278, 318 n.2.
243. See Valeria, 307 F.3d at 1042.
244. See Washington, 426 U.S. at 242.
245. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist., 411 U.S. at 37–40.
246. See Pauken & Daniel, supra note 55, at 759.
247. See Guardians Ass’n, 463 U.S. at 610–12, 642.
248. See Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 282.
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not exist.249 As a result, the federal government is the only entity that can enforce the
disparate impact regulations of Title VI.250 It also appears that private entities and
individuals cannot enforce the disparate impact regulations of Title VI through 1983
actions.251 Finally, when challenging a public or private school’s disciplinary practices
under section 1981, students must also demonstrate intentional discrimination.252
C.	Final Guidance on Maintaining, Collecting, and Reporting Racial and Ethnic
Data to the U.S. Department of Education

Recently, the U.S. Department of Education issued the “Final Guidance on
Maintaining, Collecting, and Reporting Racial and Ethnic Data to the U.S.
Department of Education” (hereinafter Guidance), which may further complicate
issues in recognizing and addressing the disproportionate representation of African
American students in school discipline.253 The final implementation date for reporting
data under the Guidance will take place during the 2010–11 school year.254 This marks
the first time that the federal government has dictated the procedures for collecting
and reporting data on the race and ethnicity of students of educational institutions.
The Guidance requires student data collection using a two-question format. The
Guidance will require that educational institutions raise an initial question about the
individuals’ ethnicity that requires them to respond to whether they are Hispanic/
Latino.255 Then educational institutions are required to allow students to “mark one or
more” categories of the following racial groups that applies to them: 1) American
Indian or Alaska Native, 2) Asian, 3) Black or African American, 4) Native Hawaiian
or Other Pacific Islander, and 5) White.256 The Guidance makes the Hispanic/Latino
249. Id. at 291–93.
250. See Dunn, supra note 239.
251. See Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 285–86.
252. See Parker, 823 F. Supp. at 512.
253. Dep’t of Educ., Final Guidance on Maintaining, Collecting and Reporting Racial and Ethnic Data to

the Department of Education, 72 Fed. Reg. 202, 59,266 (Oct. 19, 2007), available at http://dpi.wi.gov/
lbstat/pdf/dataraceguidance.pdf [hereinafter Guidance].

254. Id. at 59,267.
255. The definition of Hispanic or Latino is “a person of Cuban, Mexican, Puerto Rican, South or Central

American, or other Spanish culture or origin, regardless of race.” Id. at 59,274. The authors further want
to note that both the words “Hispanic” and Latino” are used in this paper as English language words.
“Latino” has its translation in the Spanish language and is masculine in gender and the feminine gender
translation is “Latina.” English language nouns, however, do not have gender. Thus, for the English
language Latino refers to both males and females while Spanish language data collection should use the
masculine (“Latino”) and feminine (“Latina”) nomenclature, such as “Latino/a.”

256. The definitions in the Guidance are as follows:

(1) American Indian or Alaska Native- A person having origins in any of the original
peoples of North and South America (including Central America), and who maintains
tribal affiliation or community attachment; (2) Asian American-A person having origins
in any of the original peoples of the Far East, Southeast Asia, or the Indian subcontinent
including, for example, Cambodia, China, India, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Pakistan, the
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ethnic category trump over all the racial categories. Thus, educational programs must
report to the Department of Education as Hispanic/Latino individuals who checked
“yes” to the Hispanic/Latino question, regardless of what racial groups they designate.257
The Guidance requires that educational institutions report students who checked “no”
to the Hispanic/Latino ethnic question, but checked more than one racial category as
“Two or More Races.”258 The Guidance also requires educational institutions to report
Black/White, Black/Asian, and Black/American Indian students as “Two or More
Races”—we refer to these students as “Black Multiracials.” Therefore, educational
institutions must now report some students formerly classified as black as either
Hispanic/Latino or Two or More Races. The Two or More Races category, however,
will include all of those non-Hispanic/Latinos who checked more than one race box.
Research on racial disparities in school discipline has established that the race of
the individual student and socioeconomic status of the student’s family impact racial
disparity.259 Each of these factors works independently, with blacks disproportionately
subjected to more disciplinary proceedings than whites and low socioeconomic
students disciplined at higher rates than their peers from higher socioeconomic
families.260 Census Bureau statistics indicate that the socioeconomic status of Black
Hispanic students is similar to that of other African American students.261 However,
Black Multiracial students are more likely to live with both parents, live in families
with higher incomes, live with families that own their own home, and have parents
with more education than other blacks.262
The implications of the Guidance for monitoring and addressing racial and
ethnic disparities in school discipline are at this point difficult to predict. On the one
hand, removal of Black Hispanic students from the Black or African American
category may not have much of an effect on disproportionate outcomes in the latter
category in some geographical areas. On the other hand, removal of Black Multiracial
students, a group that appears to be more economically advantaged on average than
Philippine Islands, Thailand, and Vietnam; (3) Black or African American- A person
having origins in any of the black racial groups of Africa; (4) Native Hawaiian or Other
Pacific Islander- A person having origins in any of the original peoples of Hawaii, Guam,
Samoa, or other Pacific Islands; and (5) White. A person having origins in any of the
original peoples of Europe, the Middle East, or North Africa.

Id. (citing Standards for Maintaining, Collecting, and Presenting Federal Data on Race and Ethnicity,
62 Fed. Reg. 58,789 (Oct. 30, 1977)).
257. Id. at 59,267.
258. See id.
259. See generally The Color of Discipline, supra note 124, at 23; Wu, supra note 30, at 7.
260. See discussion supra Part III.A1–2.
261. See John R. Logan, How Race Counts for Hispanic Americans 3–4 (2003), available at http://

mumford.albany.edu/census/BlackLatinoReport/BlackLatinoReport.pdf.

262. Simon Cheng & Seena Mostafavipour, The Differences and Similarities Between Biracial

and Monoracial Couples: A Sociodemographic Sketch Based on the Census 2000 6 (2005),
available at http://www.allacademic.com//meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/0/2/2/1/9/pages22192/
p22192-1.php.
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those remaining in the Black/African American category, may increase the
disproportionality of those remaining in the Black/African American category. Thus,
it remains to be seen whether and how the change in data collection under the
Guidance will affect the measurement of disproportionality in school discipline and
other key educational indicators. Nor is it clear, if there are substantial discontinuities
between the old and new methods of reporting, whether the new racial/ethnic
breakdowns will make it easier or harder for students of color to demonstrate
statistical discrepancies in school discipline. Finally, it is impossible to predict the
response of the courts should there be a discontinuity in the data as a result of the
adoption of the Guidelines. Will the court see discontinuities as the inevitable result
of changes in measurement methodology, or will any changes in findings as a result
of the Guidance be viewed with suspicion—a sign that findings of racial and ethnic
disparity are statistically unstable?
IV.	History and Status of the Movement Towards Colorblind
Constitutionalism

In order to understand why racial disproportionality in school disciplinary actions
does not generally trigger successful legal claims, it is important to understand the
Supreme Court’s concept of race discrimination, in particular how the Court has
been consistently moving towards a view of the constitution as colorblind with regard
to issues of race and ethnic discrimination. A majority of the justices on the Court
have not yet embraced a colorblind interpretation of the constitution. For example,
selective colleges and universities are still able to use racial classifications in an
individualized admissions process to obtain a critical mass of underrepresented
minorities with a history of discrimination.263 In addition, the government can still
employ racial classifications in an effort to remedy identified acts of discrimination. 264
Finally, in the summer of 2007, Justice Kennedy wrote the deciding opinion in
Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1. 265 Except in
limited circumstances, Kennedy rejected the ability of public schools to use individual
racial classifications in order to pursue integrated schools.266 However, he states that
school officials are free to devise various race-conscious measures that don’t employ
individual racial classifications in order to pursue integrated schools. 267
263. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 334 (2003) (“We find that the Law School’s admissions program

bears the hallmarks of a narrowly tailored plan.”).

264. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989).
265. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 782–98 (2007) (Kennedy,

J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).

266. For a discussion of Justice Kennedy’s opinion see Kevin Brown, Reflections on Justice Kennedy’s Opinion in

Parents Involved: Why Fifty Years Of Experience Shows Kennedy is Right, 59 S.C. L. Rev. 735, 740–52 (2008).

267. See Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 789 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part, concurring in judgment). These

race-conscious measures include “strategic site selection of new schools; drawing attendance zones with
general recognition of the demographics of neighborhoods; allocating resources for special programs;
recruiting students and faculty in a targeted fashion; and tracking enrollments, performance, and other
statistics by race.” Id.
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Despite these exceptions to the general rule, however, the Supreme Court over
the past four decades has been marching towards a colorblind interpretation of race
discrimination under the Constitution. This evolution has drastically limited avenues
for challenging educational practices resulting in disparate outcomes and has ushered
in race-neutral practices in public schools that could arguably impact student
discipline involving racial discrimination.
A. History of Colorblind Constitutionalism

In response to the majority decision in Plessy v. Ferguson that “separate but equal”
treatment was constitutional, Justice John Marshall Harlan of the Supreme Court
noted in an oft-quoted dissent:
Our Constitution is colorblind and neither knows nor tolerates classes among
citizens. With respect to civil rights, all citizens are equal before the law. The
humblest is the peer of the most powerful. The law regards man as man, and
takes no account of his surroundings or of his color when his civil rights as
guaranteed by the supreme law of the land are involved. 268

It is important to recognize that Justice Harlan was not, in this dissent, signaling his
status as an advocate for oppressed African Americans. He went on only three years
later to write the opinion in Cumming v. Richmond County Board of Education.269 In
Cumming the Supreme Court unanimously upheld the right of a Georgia school
board to close its only black high school while allowing the board to continue to
provide for high school education for white students, thus seemingly ignoring its own
separate but equal doctrine.270 Indeed, Harlan seemed to believe that colorblindness
would vindicate the superiority of the white race:
The white race deems itself to be the dominant race in this country. And so it
is, in prestige, in achievements, in education, in wealth, and in power. So, I
doubt not, it will continue to be for all time, if it remains true to its great
heritage and holds fast to the principles of constitutional liberty. 271

The unanimous ruling in Brown v. Board of Education decisively overturned the
doctrine of separate but equal. 272 The landmark ruling ushered in a fifteen-year
period in which all three branches of government contributed to addressing racial
inequality in education, employment, housing, and voting rights.273 In its decision in
Brown, the Court noted that “to separate [black students] from others of similar age
268. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
269. 175 U.S. 528 (1899) (cited in Albert L. Samuels, Is Separate Unequal: Black Colleges and the

Challenge to Desegregation 31 (2004)).

270. Id.
271. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
272. Brown v Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954).
273. See Gary Orfield & Susan E. Eaton, Dismantling Desegregation: The Quiet Reversal of

Brown v. Board of Education (1996).
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and qualification” generates harm to black students and the impact of that harm is
greater when it has the sanction of law.274 Although the actual perspective of the
Brown decision with respect to race consciousness is difficult to determine, it is clear
that much of the civil rights progress that occurred through the 1960s and early
1970s was predicated upon a special concern about assisting blacks to overcome the
impact of historical discrimination. In his landmark speech at Howard University in
June, 1965, President Lyndon Johnson stated:
You do not wipe away the scars of centuries by saying: Now you are free to go
where you want, and do as you desire, and choose the leaders as you please.
You do not take a person who, for years, has been hobbled by chains and
liberate him, bring him up to the starting line of a race and then say, “you are
free to compete with all the others,” and still justly believe that you have been
completely fair.275

By the early 1970s however, as the effect of more conservative Nixon era
appointees began to be felt, the courts started to limit or roll back many of the
principles that had guided post-Brown civil rights reform. In Keyes v. School District
No. 1, the Court backed away from the implication that the racial separation of blacks
was the basis of the constitutional violation of segregated schools. 276 The Court
found that determining whether the racial and ethnic separation in public schools
violated the Constitution depended upon the cause of the separation, and therefore
distinguished between de facto and de jure segregation. Unlike de facto segregation,
which could be established by showing a racial concentration of black students in the
various public schools of a given school district, the Court defined de jure segregation
as a “current condition of segregation resulting from intentional state action directed
specifically to [segregated schools].”277 De jure, not de facto, segregation violated the
Constitution. 278 Thus, if racially separate schools were not the result of racially
motivated decision making, then such separation did not meet the definition of
unconstitutional segregation.
B. Effects of a Colorblind Perspective

The Supreme Court’s current Equal Protection jurisprudence treats government
as if it were an individual, presuming that the actions of government are motivated
by its intentions. Whether racial discrimination by government violates the Equal
Protection Clause is determined by focusing principally on the motivations of the
governmental actors, not the effects of their actions. 279 Government actions not
274. Brown, 347 U.S. at 494.
275. President Lyndon B. Johnson, Commencement Address at Howard University, To Fulfill These Rights,

June 4, 1965.

276. Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
277. Id. at 205–06.
278. Id.
279. See discussion supra Part III.B.
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intended to be racial in nature may have a discriminatory effect on members of
certain racial or ethnic groups, including blacks. Yet the individuals whose interest is
harmed by actions motivated by non-racial concerns are not viewed as victims of
racial discrimination, since it is not the consequences of government’s actions that
determine racial discrimination, but the intent that motivated the actions. That is,
government actions are presumed to be colorblind unless it can be shown that there
was an intent to discriminate based on race.
This judicial philosophy has made it increasingly difficult for African American
plaintiffs seeking to challenge the impact of a variety of educational practices as
discriminatory.280 Early challenges to educational tracking, such as Hobson v. Hansen,
succeeded by arguing that separate tracks failed to remediate the educational
disadvantage of black schoolchildren.281 More recently, however, the Seventh Circuit,
in its 1997 decision in People Who Care v. Rockford Board of Education School District,
accepted tracking as a legitimate educational strategy. 282 In Rockford, the Seventh
Circuit effectively viewed the disparate placement of Black and Latino students in
lower ability tracks as simply the unfortunate result of race neutral academic
judgments that therefore did not produce any Equal Protection violations.283 Federal
280. For a discussion of the change in judicial philosophy that evidences a special concern for the educational

rights of black children to one that is based more on racially neutral decision making and colorblindness
see Kevin Brown, Race, Law And Education In The Post-Desegregatrion Era, 199–270 (2005).

281. See Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 469–70 (D.D.C. 1967). Until 1981, the Fifth Circuit covered the

following former states of the Old Confederacy: Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, and
Texas. Thus, before 1981, the applicable constitutional law for a large number of southern school districts
came from the Fifth Circuit. Two years after Hobson, the Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc in Singleton v.
Jackson Municipal Separate School District, rejected a plan to desegregate two school districts after the
district court approved plans to assign students to schools on the basis of achievement test scores. 419 F.2d
1211 (5th Cir. 1969). “We pretermit a discussion of the validity per se of a plan based on testing except to
hold that testing cannot be employed in any event until unitary school systems have been established.” Id.
at 1219. Two years later, the Fifth Circuit addressed an appeal from an order of a district court approving
a school board plan to desegregate its schools by assigning students to one of two schools based on their
scores on the California Achievement Test. Lemon v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 444 F.2d 1400 (5th Cir. 1971).
Again rejecting a plan to assign students to different schools based on their academic abilities, the Fifth
Circuit stated that “regardless of the innate validity of testing, it could not be used until a school district
had been established as a unitary system. We think at a minimum this means that the district in question
most [sic] have for several years operated as a unitary system.” Id. at 1401.

282. People Who Care v. Rockford Bd. of Educ. Sch. Dist., 111 F.3d 528 (7th Cir. 1997), aff ’g in part and rev’g in

part, People Who Care v. Rockford Bd. of Educ. Sch. Dist., No. 89 C 20168, 1996 WL 364802 (N.D. Ill.
June 7, 1996) (containing comprehensive remedial order), aff ’g in part and rev’g in part, People Who Care v.
Rockford Bd. of Educ. Sch. Dist., 851 F. Supp. 905 (N.D. Ill. 1994) (containing findings of liability).

283. As Judge Posner, writing for the Court, concluded:

Tracking is a controversial educational policy . . . . Lawyers and judges are not competent
to resolve the controversy. The conceit that they are belongs to a myth of the legal
profession’s omnicompetence that was exploded long ago. To abolish tracking is to say
to bright kids, whether white or black, that they have to go at a slower pace than they’re
capable of; it is to say to the parents of the brighter kids that their children don’t really
belong in the public school system; and it is to say to the slower kids, of whatever race,
that they may have difficulty keeping up, because the brighter kids may force the pace
of the class . . . . The well-known correlation between race and academic performance
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courts have replicated this march towards colorblindness across civil rights challenges
to a number of educational practices, including high-stakes testing, curriculum, and
minority teacher hiring.284
This shift in perspective has important implications for challenges to racial and
ethnic disparities in discipline. As long as the movement towards colorblindness
continues to dominate the Supreme Court’s perspective about race discrimination,
African Americans will not be able to turn racial disparities generated by educational
policies and practices into successful legal arguments, because discrimination is only
recognized when it is the result of discriminatory intent. Since educational policies
and practices (e.g., suspension and expulsion) can usually be justified on legitimate
educational concerns (e.g., school safety), it will be difficult to prove that those
policies and practices were primarily motivated by racial considerations. Regardless
of the extent of the negative disparate impact of school discipline policies and
practices upon African American students, federal courts will view such outcomes as
the unfortunate result of racially neutral decision making that does not violate the
Equal Protection Clause.
C. Critiques of Colorblind Constitutionalism

Numerous criticisms of colorblind constitutionalism exist. These include: a) the
logical impossibility of philosophical colorblindness, b) the contradiction between
the colorblind theory and the lived reality of race in America, and c) the limited
effectiveness of race-neutral alternatives.
In his critique of colorblind constitutionalism, Neil Gotanda points out that the
non-recognition required by colorblind alternatives in hiring or admissions inevitably
yields a logical contradiction.285 He distinguishes between medical colorblindness, in
which failure to see an object is clearly a physical/perceptual deficit, and racial
colorblindness, in which race is supposedly noticed but not considered.286 The extent
to which race consciousness is present in all of us makes such purposeful nonrecognition an impossibility:
To argue that one did not really consider the race of an African-American is
to concede that there was an identification of Blackness. Suppressing the
recognition of a racial classification in order to act as if a person were not of
some cognizable racial class is inherently racially premised. 287

It is an inescapable reality that race is in no way neutral in twenty-first century
American society and American education. Despite the determination of our nation’s
makes tracking, even when implemented in accordance with strictly objective criteria, a
pretty effective segregator.

People Who Care, 111 F.3d at 536.

284. For a description of this, see Brown, supra note 280, at 237–69.
285. Neil Gotanda, A Critique of “Our Constitution is Color-Blind,” 44 Stan. L. Rev. 1, 16 (1991).
286. Id. at 18–19.
287. Id. at 19.
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first black President not to highlight the issue of race, controversies about the topic
have continued to figure prominently in the national dialogue on a range of issues.288
Racial and ethnic disparities remain widespread in education, from the minoritywhite achievement gap, 289 to disproportionality in special education, 290 to dropout
and graduation rates, 291 to eligibility for gifted/talented programs.292 Current theories
in sociology, anthropology, and education strongly indicate that the most prevalent
issues of racial discrimination today tend not to result from intentional or blatant
racism. 293 Rather, disparate outcomes appear to be shaped by individuals within
institutions, participating in habitual patterns of action.294 These patterns may be
largely unconscious, but if left unchecked, contribute to discriminatory outcomes
that reproduce inequity and reduce educational opportunity for certain groups. It
seems almost certain that most educators today do not consciously intend to refer or
suspend a greater proportion of black students. Yet, when the primary reasons for
black disciplinary over-referral are not serious, safety-threatening behaviors, but
rather more subjective and interactional behaviors such as non-compliance, disrespect,
and loitering, 295 it is hard to imagine that the school system is not making some
contribution to disparate outcomes in school discipline.
Finally, scholars have reported that race-neutral policies are not as effective as
race-conscious policies in creating a more diverse student body. A report published
by the National Academy of Education in 2007 examined the research cited in the
288. See, e.g., Jeff Zeleny & Jim Rutenberg, As Race Debate Grows, Obama Steers Clear of It, N.Y. Times, Sept. 16,

2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/17/us/politics/17obama.html?scp=7&sq=obama%20
race&st=cse (commenting on a string of race-based controversies that have dogged the Obama
Administration from Rev. Jeremiah Wright to the health care debate, the New York Times noted in a
front page commentary: “President Obama has long suggested that he would like to move beyond race.
The question now is whether the country will let him.”).

289. Gloria Ladson-Billings, From the Achievement Gap to the Education Debt: Understanding Achievement in

U. S. Schools, 35 Educ. Researcher 3, 3 (2006).

290. Comm. on Minority Representation in Special Educ., Minority Students in Special and

Gifted Education (M. Suzanne Donovan & Christopher T. Cross eds., 2002).

291. Johanna Wald & Daniel J.Losen, Out of Sight: The Journey Through the School-to-Prison Pipeline, in

Invisible Children in the Society and its Schools 23–27 (Sue Books ed., 3d ed. 2007).

292. H. Richard Milner & Donna Y. Ford, Cultural Considerations in the Underrepresentation of Culturally

Diverse Elementary Students in Gifted Education, 29 Roeper Rev. 166 (2007).

293. See, e.g., Sonia Nieto, Affirming Diversity: The Sociopolitical Context of Multicultural

Education (Pearson Education, Inc./Allyn & Bacon 2008) (1992).

294. Developed as an explanation of the perpetuation of social class hierarchies, the theoretical framework of

cultural reproduction has been utilized by equity researchers to demonstrate how institutional and
individual actions maintain a hierarchical status quo at the expense of less-privileged groups. Cultural
reproduction implies that individuals can become a part of institutional patterns through constitutive
actions that can reproduce the status quo without being consciously aware of their contribution to
inequity. See, e.g., Hugh Mehan, Understanding Inequality in Schools: The Contribution of Interpretive
Studies, 65 Soc. of Educ. 1, (1992); Jeannie Oakes, The Reproduction of Inequity: The Content of Secondary
School Tracking, 14 Urban Rev. 107 (1982).

295. Anne Gregory & Rhona S. Weinstein, A Window on the Discipline Gap: Defiance or Cooperation in the

High School Classroom, 46 J. Sch. Psychol. 455 (2009).
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amicus briefs of the Parents Involved296 case to determine whether race-neutral plans
are as effective as race-conscious plans in creating a more diverse student body.297
Highlighting the experiences of school districts that adopted race-neutral student
assignment plans in San Francisco, California; LaCrosse, Wisconsin; and Wake
County, North Carolina, the authors concluded that “although assignments made on
the basis of socioeconomic status are likely to marginally reduce racial isolation and
may have other benefits—none of the proposed alternatives is as effective as raceconscious policies for achieving racial diversity.”298 These findings are consistent with
other scholars’ conclusions. Reardon, Yun and Kurlaender report that race-neutral
policies based on socioeconomic status are unlikely to “substantially reduce
segregation.” 299 Finally, Mickelson suggests that research indicates that racial
segregation increased when Charlotte, North Carolina adopted a more race-neutral
approach after the court declared the district unitary.300
D. Current Status of Colorblind Constitutionalism

It could be argued that the march towards colorblind constitutionalism, and its
incorporation into decisions supporting primarily race-neutral solutions, have today
become the dominant perspective of the courts. In 2007, the U.S. Supreme Court held
in the Parents Involved case that racial classifications in student assignment plans in
Louisville and Seattle violated the constitution.301 In a plurality decision, Chief Justice
John Roberts, asserted that racial classification to balance student populations was
unconstitutional,302 stating that: “The way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is
to stop discriminating on the basis of race.”303 While Justice Roberts and three other
justices seemed to accept the concept of a colorblind Constitution, the idea did not win
over a majority of the Court. Despite concurring with the majority, Justice Kennedy
also wrote a separate opinion that rejects the colorblind approach, stating:
[t]he statement by Justice Harlan that “[o]ur Constitution is color-blind” was
most certainly justified in the context of his dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson . . . .
And . . . [the] axiom must command our assent. In the real world, it is
regrettable to say, it cannot be a universal constitutional principal. 304
296. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 820–23.
297. Nat’l Acad. of Educ., Race-Conscious Policies for Assigning Students to Schools: Social Science

Research and the Supreme Court Cases 23–24 (Robert L. Linn & Kevin G. Welner eds., 2007).

298. Id. at 3, 42.
299. Sean Reardon, John Yun, & Michal Kurlaender, Implications of Income-Based School Assignment Policies

for Racial School Segregation, 28 Educ. Eval. & Pol’y 1 (2006).

300. Rosalyn Arlin Mickelson, The Academic Consequences of Desegregation and Segregation: Evidence from the

Charlotte-Mecklenburg Schools, 81 N.C. L. Rev. 1513, 1558 (2003).s

301. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 701.
302. Christopher W. Schmidt, Brown and the Colorblind Constitution, 94 Cornell L. Rev. 203 (2008).
303. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 787.
304. Id. at 787–88 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
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He noted that “[f]ifty years of experience since Brown v. Board of Education, should
teach us that the problem before us defies so easy a solution.”305 In addition, Justice
Breyer’s opinion for the four dissenting justices was part of a long line of constitutional
thought that has viewed the Equal Protection Clause as a means to protect the rights
of disadvantaged minorities as opposed to individuals.306
Clearly not all members of the Roberts’s Court agree with the Court’s colorblind
interpretation of the Constitution with regard to race discrimination. Justice
Ginsburg, in her dissenting opinion in Gratz v. Bollinger argued that when a racial
classification “denies a benefit, causes harm or imposes a burden,” then “in that sense
the Constitution is colorblind.” 307 She further reasoned, however, that “the
Constitution is color conscious to prevent discrimination being perpetuated and to
undo the effects of past discrimination.”308
Regardless of the lack of a clear majority in Parents Involved, the plurality’s
interpretation of a colorblind constitution prompted the Bush Administration to
promote race neutral policies in the public schools. After the Parents Involved
decision, the U.S. Department of Education’s Office for Civil Rights responded to
the decision with a letter stating that “[t]he Department of Education strongly
encourages the use of race-neutral methods for assigning students to elementary and
secondary schools.”309 The Bush administration went on record in favor of raceneutral policies in both higher education and K–12 education. 310
In summary, understanding the Court’s perspective on colorblind constitutionalism
helps clarify the reasons for the gulf between research-based evidence and case law
regarding disciplinary disproportionality. The requirement that governmental actions
that create racial disparities can be found discriminatory only if intent can be proven
creates a nearly insurmountable barrier for African American students seeking to
challenge those practices. The exceedingly narrow interpretation of discrimination
under colorblind individualism also places the Court at significant variance from the
305. Id. at 788.
306. The four dissenters in Parents Involved rejected the colorblind interpretation. They based their decision on

a notion of a group orientation of society. For them, what the school districts sought to do was to take
account of race—not to exclude, but to include individuals. The dissent’s criticism of the decision rejected
the current interpretation of a colorblind constitution. The dissent noted that “[t]he histories also indicate
the complexity of the tasks and the practical difficulties that local school boards face when they seek to
achieve greater racial integration,” and reasoned that “[a] longstanding and unbroken line of legal authority
tells us that the Equal Protection Clause permits local school boards to use race-conscious criteria to achieve
positive race-related goals, even when the Constitution does not compel it.” Id. at 822–23 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).

307. 539 U.S. 244, 302 (2003) (Souter, J., dissenting).
308. Id.
309. Guidance letter from Stephanie J. Monroe, Assistant Sec’y for Civil Rights, Office for Civil Rights of

the U.S. Dep’t of Educ., The Use Of Race in Assigning Students to Elementary and Secondary Schools
(Aug. 28, 2008), available at http://www.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/raceassign mentese.html.

310. See U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Office for Civil Rights, Race-Neutral Alternatives in Postsecondary

Education: Innovative Approaches to Diversity (2003), available at http://www.ed.gov/about/
offices/list/ocr/edlite-raceneutralreport.html.

1109

AFRICAN AMERICAN DISPROPORTIONALITY IN SCHOOL DISCIPLINE

common understanding of racial disparities. As Nicholas Katzenbach, U.S. Attorney
General during the Johnson Administration, states in his critique of the colorblind
perspective in affirmative action cases:
It is very nearly as if this court has simply mandated that what is the country’s
historic struggle against racial oppression and racial prejudice cannot be acted
upon in a race-conscious way—that the law must view racial problems
observable by all as if oppression and prejudice did not exist and had never
existed. The court’s majority, in other words, has come very close to saying . . .
that courts cannot be permitted to see what is plain to everybody else. 311
V.	Summary and Conclusions

The courts have, despite opportunities, refused to provide access for relief to
students of color in school disciplinary cases. Courts have taken a hands-off approach
for the following three reasons: 1) the courts continue to grant deference to school
officials (ignoring the existing research base on school discipline), 2) the courts have
narrowed the legal claims available for students claiming racial discrimination in
school disciplinary matters, and 3) the Supreme Court has moved towards embracing
a colorblind approach to racial discrimination in schools.
The courts’ deference to school administrators in school disciplinary matters is
problematic for students bringing these types of claims. Courts have consistently
refused to second-guess school officials in disciplinary matters. Oftentimes, the
lower courts cite language from the Goss v. Lopez decision to demonstrate the extreme
deference given to school officials in disciplinary matters.312 The courts’ application
of in loco parentis thus appears to give school officials extensive leeway in school
disciplinary matters. Specifically, the importance of maintaining safe schools and a
climate free of disruption leads courts to hesitate to interfere in school disciplinary
matters. This leads to a profound paradox in the application of school discipline. The
courts tend to permit schools officials to use almost any tool if it is intended to
improve school safety or reduce disruption. Yet research has consistently demonstrated
that the most common of these tools—suspension and expulsion—are ineffective in
achieving those ends. Thus, by giving schools wide latitude to implement any
disciplinary options that are intended to guarantee safety or reduce disruption, the
courts may have contributed to retarding the growth of an effective technology of
311. Nicholas deB. Katzenbach & Burke Marshall, Not Color Blind: Just Blind, in Sex, Race, and Merit:

Debating Affirmative Action in Education and Employment 48, 55 (Faye J. Crosby & Cheryl
VanDeVeer eds., 2000).

312. As the U.S. Supreme Court articulated in Goss, “[b]y and large, public education in our Nation is

committed to the control of state and local authorities.” 419 U.S. at 578 (quoting Epperson, 393 U.S. at
104). The Supreme Court also asserted in 1968 that “[j]udicial interposition in the operation of the
public school system of the Nation raises problems requiring care and restraint.” Epperson, 393 U.S. at
104. Nevertheless, “it is not the role of the federal courts to set aside the decisions of school administrators
which the court may view as lacking a basis in wisdom or compassion.” Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S.
308, 326 (1975).
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school discipline by supporting schools in the use of measures that have not been
shown to be effective.
These cases demonstrate the difficulty students of color may have when asserting
a claim of racial discrimination in school disciplinary practices. Courts have generally
concluded that private entities challenging school disciplinary policies or practices
under the Equal Protection Clause, Title VI and section 1981, must prove that their
adoption or administration is motivated by discriminatory intent. In rare cases, courts
could infer discriminatory intent from statistical evidence. However, the use of the
statistical evidence is for establishing discriminatory intent. Disparate impact of
disciplinary policies and practices alone does not trigger a finding of discrimination.
Before the Supreme Court’s 2001 opinion in Sandoval, it was possible for private
parties to assert discrimination under the disparate impact regulations of Title VI.
The Supreme Court, however, foreclosed that possibility with its conclusion in
Sandoval that there is no private right of action to enforce the disparate impact
regulations of Title VI. Federal courts have also rejected efforts to get around the
Sandoval decision by rejecting arguments that the disparate impact regulations of
Title VI can be enforced through a section 1983 action. Now, the federal government
is the only entity that can enforce the disparate impact regulations of Title VI.313
Together, these analyses beg the question of whether courts could ever find evidence
of discrimination in school discipline cases. Since educators usually have an educational
justification for any particular disciplinary action that they take, it is difficult to prove
that educators who took those actions were motivated by discriminatory intent.
Although the courts note that intent to discriminate could be demonstrated by statistical
evidence, even when substantial evidence is presented, the courts are not typically
swayed. Since Sandoval removed the private right of action in challenging disparate
outcomes, it is unclear whether even the strongest combination of individual and
statistical evidence would be sufficient to bring a successful challenge to racial disparities
in discipline. Finally, the adoption of new Guidelines for describing racial/ethnic
categories most likely adds an additional element of uncertainty to measuring and
addressing disproportionality in discipline, since it is, at this time, unclear whether
those new guidelines will impact data on racial and ethnic disparities and how the
court might interpret such measurement-based changes.
The discretion given to school officials combined with the limitations placed on
actions under Title VI and section 1983 constitute a clear setback for students of
color. Several advocacy groups are lobbying Congress and the current administration
to propose and sign legislation that would clarify that “Title VI applies to all
discrimination, intentional or otherwise.”314 In June 2009, a resolution was introduced
at the New York City Council “urging Congress to reintroduce and subsequently
pass legislation that would restore a private right of action to individuals seeking to
313. The Supreme Court noted in Sandoval that the disparate impact regulations of Title VI stand “in

considerable tension” with Title VI. Thus, the Court may be signaling a willingness to reject the
disparate impact regulations of Title VI when the Court has the opportunity to do so. See Sandoval, 532
U.S. at 275.

314. Id.
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challenge violations of civil rights under federal regulations implementing Title VI
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.”315
Bills to restore the protections against race discrimination that were negated in
Sandoval were introduced in both the House and Senate in April 2009. The bills seek
to amend section 601 of Title VI that prohibits intentional discrimination, to add a
new subsection that prohibits any practice “that causes a disparate impact on the basis
of race, color, or national origin.”316 It would also amend section 602 of Title VI to
allow private individuals to bring lawsuits to remedy Title VI violations.317 Although
the bills expired, they will likely be reintroduced in a subsequent congressional
session.318 If the regulations were restored to their pre-Sandoval status, students would
have a private right of action under Title VI to initiate a lawsuit under a disparate
impact claim. As such, it is possible that disparate impact claims, which would not
require students to demonstrate intent, may become possible again in the future.
For the foreseeable future, the most fruitful remedies for those seeking to challenge
racial/ethnic discrimination in school discipline may well be extra-judicial. One
approach that could be used to address the lack of legal remedies in this area would be
for advocacy groups interested in disciplinary reform to lobby Congress to pass
previously proposed amendments to Title VI. In addition, the continued dissemination
of evidence-based practices in school discipline and school violence prevention,
especially to school administrators, is important in order to increase understanding of
the impact of expulsion and suspension, especially on students of color.
It is somewhat startling to realize that, fifty years after Brown v. Board of
Education, 319 there exists no sure legal remedy that would allow African American
students to challenge even those practices that create the most disparate negative
outcomes. The unanimous Brown decision led to a relatively brief period of activism
and optimism that viewed the law as an affirmative tool to address the effects of
historical and current discrimination. Yet since the mid-1970s, the courts have
increasingly retreated into a narrow interpretation of discrimination that is at variance
with both logic and evidence, effectively closing off challenges to the racial impact of
educational practices. On May 17, 1954, African Americans were finally granted the
right to send their children to a public school of their choosing. It remains to be seen
when children of color will be guaranteed the right to be treated equally once they
arrive at school.

315. N.Y. City Council Res. 2059-2009, available at http://legistar.council.nyc.gov/LegislationDetail.

aspx?ID=452752&GUID=7B44C88E-2207-4465-948D-BF2A7EBB0262&Search=&Options=.

316. Dunn, supra note 239.
317. Id.
318. Id.
319. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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